YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROJECT RECOMMENDATION BY THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY REGARDING THE SUITABILITY OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE FOR A REPOSITORY UNDER THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1982 by NA
PERMANENT 
YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROJECT 
Recommendation by the Secretary of Energy Regarding the 
Suitability of the Yucca Mountain Site for a Repository 
under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 
U.S. Department of Energy 
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 
DOE 
February 2002 
Recommendation by the Secretary of Energy 
Regarding the Suitability of the Yucca Mountain Site 
for a Repository Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 
February 2002 
............................................................................................................................... I . Introduction I 
2 . Background ............................................................................................................................... 3 
2.1. History of the Yucca Mountain Project and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act ................ 3 
2.2. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the Responsibilities of the Department of 
Energy and the Secretary .................................................................................................. 5 
3 . Decision ..................................................................................................................................... 6 
3.1. The Recommendation ....................................................................................................... 6 
3.2. What This Recommendation Means. and What It Does Not Mean ............................. 6 
4 . Decision Determination Methodology and the Decision-Making Process ............................. 7 
5 . Decision Criteria ...................................................................................................................... 8 
................................................................................. 5.1. Scientific and Technical Suitability 9 
5.2. National Interest Considerations ................................................................................... 10 
6 . Is Yucca Mountain Scientifically and Technically Suitable for Development 
of a Repository? ..................................................................................................................... 12 
6.1. Framework for Suitability Determination ..................................................................... 12 
6.1.1. General Outline .......................................................................................................... 12 
.................................................................................. 6.1.2. Radiation Protection Standards 
........................................................................................... 
13 
6.1.3. Underlying Hard Science 16 
7 . Results of Suitability Evaluations and Conclusions .............................................................. 18 
7.1. Results of Pre-Closure Evaluations ............................................................................... 18 
7.2. Results of Post-Closure Evaluations .............................................................................. 20 
8 . The National Interest .............................................................................................................. 26 
8.1. Nuclear Science and the National Interest .................................................................... 26 
8.2. Energy Security ............................................................................................................... 27 
8.3. National Security ............................................................................................................. 28 
8.3.1. Powering the Navy Nuclear Fleet .............................................................................. 28 
8.3.2. Allowing the Nation to Decommission Its Surplus Nuclear Weapons and 
Support Nuclear Non-Proliferation Efforts .............................................................. 28 
........................................................................................... 8.4. Protecting the Environment 29 
8.5. Facilitating Continuation of Research. Medical. and Humanitarian Programs ........ 30 
8.6. Assisting Anti-Terrorism at Home ................................................................................. 30 
8.7. Summary ........................................................................................................................... 31 
9 . None of the Arguments Against Yucca Mountain Withstands Analysis .............................. 31 
9.1. Assertion 1: The Citizens of Nevada Were Denied an Adequate Opportunity 
to Be Heard ..................................................................................................................... 32 
......................................... 9.2. Assertion 2: The Project Has Received Inadequate Study 33 
............................ 9.3. Assertion 3: The Rules Were Changed in the Middle of the Game 33 
...................................................... 9.4. Assertion 4: The Process Tramples States' Rights 37 
9.5. Assertion 5: Transportation of Nuclear Materials is Disruptive and 
Dangerous ..................................................................................................................... 38 
9.6. Assertion 6: Transportation of Wastes to the Site Will Have a Dramatically 
...................................................................... Negative Economic Impact on I. as Vegas 39 
9.7. Assertion 7: It is Premature for DOE to Make a Site Recommendation for 
............................................................................................................... Various Reasons 43 
9.7.1. The General Accounting Office has concluded that it is premature for DOE to 
............................................................................. make a site recommendation now 43 
9.7.2. DOE is not ready to make a site recommendation now because DOE and NRC 
have agreed on 293 technical items that need to be completed before DOE files 
a license application .................................................................................................. 44 
9.7.3. It is premature for DOE to make a recommendation now because DOE cannot 
complete this additional work unti l  2006 . The NWPA requires DOE to file a 
license application within 90 days of the approval of site designation ..................... 45 
. ............................................................................................................................. I 0  Conclusion 45 
1. Introduction 
@ For more than half a century, since nuclear science helped us win World War II and ring in the 
Atomic Age, scientists have known that !he Nation would need a secure, permanent facility in 
which to dispose of radioactive wastes. Twenty years ago, when Congress adopted the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA or "the Act"), i t  recognized the overwhelming consensus in 
the scientific community that the best option for such a facility would be a deep underground 
repository. Fifteen years ago, Congress directed the Secretary of Energy to investigate and 
recommend to the President whether such a repository could be located safely at Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada. Since then, our country has spent billions of dollars and millions of hours of 
research endeavoring to answer this question. I have carefully reviewed the product of this 
study. In my judgment, i t  constitutes sound science and shows that a safe repository can be sited 
there. I also believe that compelling national interests counsel in favor of proceeding with this 
project. Accordingly. consistent with my responsibilities under the NWPA, today I am 
recommending that Yucca Mountain be developed as the site for an underground repository for 
spent fuel and other radioactive wastes. I 
The first consideration in my decision was whether the Yucca Mountain site will safeguard the 
health and safety of the people, in Nevada and across the country, and will be effective in 
containing at minimum risk the material i t  is designed to hold. Substantial evidence shows that it 
will. Yucca Mountain is far and away the most thoroughly researched site of its kind in the 
world. It is a geologically stable site, in a closed groundwater basin, isolated on thousands of 
acres of Federal land, and farther from any metropolitan area than the great majority of less 
secure, temporary nuclear waste storage sites that exist in the country today. 
This point bears emphasis. We are not confronting a hypothetical problem. We have a 
staggering amount of radioactive waste in this country - nearly 100,000,000 gallons of high- 
level nuclear waste and more than 40,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel with more created 
every day. Our choice is not between. on the one hand, a disposal site with costs and risks held 
to a minimum, and. on the other. a magic disposal system with no costs or risks at all. Instead, 
the real choice is between a single secure site, deep under the ground at Yucca Mountain, or 
making do with what we have now or some variant of i t  - 13 1 aging surface sites, scattered 
across 39 states. Every one of those sites was built on the assumption that it would be 
temporary. As time goes by. every one is closer to the limit of its safe life span. And every one 
is at least a potential security risk - safe for today. but a question mark in decades to come. 
The Yucca Mountain facility is important to achieving a number of our national goals. It will 
promote our energy security, our national security, and safety in our homeland. It will help 
strengthen our economy and help us clean up the environment. 
The benefits of nuclear power are with us every day. Twenty percent of our country's electricity 
comes from nuclear energy. To put i t  another way, the "average" home operates on nuclear- 
generated electricity for almost five hours a day. A government with a complacent, kick-the- 
a ' For purposes of thls Recommendation, the terms "radioactive wastc" and "wastc" are used to cover high-level radioactive wastc and spent nuclear fuel, as those terms are used in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 
can-down-the-road nuclear waste disposal policy will sooner or later have to ask its citizens 
@ which five hours of electricity they would care to do without. 
Regions that produce steel, automobiles, and durable goods rely in particular on nuclear power, 
which reduces the air pollution associated with fossil fuels - greenhouse gases, solid particulate 
matter, smog, and acid rain. But environmental concerns extend further. Most commercial spent 
fuel storage facilities are near large populations centers; in fact. more than 16 1 million 
Americans live within 75 miles of these facilities. These storage sites also tend to be near rivers, 
lakes, and seacoasts. Should a radioactive release occur from one of these older, less robust 
facilities, it could contaminate any of 20 major waterways. including the Mississippi River. 
Over 30 million Americans are served by these potentially at-risk water sources. 
Our national security interests are likewise at stake. Forty percent of our warships, including 
many of the most strategic vessels in our Navy, are powered by nuclear fuel, which eventually 
becomes spent fuel. At the same time, the end of the Cold War has brought the welcome 
challenge to our Nation of disposing of surplus weapons-grade plutonium as part of the process 
of decommissioning our nuclear weapons. Regardless of whether this material is turned into 
reactor fuel or otherwise treated, an underground repository is an indispensable component in 
any plan for its complete disposition. An affirmative decision on Yucca Mountain is also likely 
to affect other nations' weapons decommissioning. since their willingness to proceed will depend 
on being satisfied that we are doing so. Moving forward with the repository will contribute to 
our global efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons in other ways, since it will 
encourage nations with weaker controls over their own materials to follow a similar path of 
@ permanent, underground disposal, thereby making it more difficult for these materials to fall into the wrong hands. By moving forward with Yucca Mountain, we will show leadership, set out a 
roadmap, and encourage other nations to follow it. 
There will be those who say the problem of nuclear waste disposal generally, and Yucca 
Mountain in particular. needs more study. In fact. both issues have been studied for more than 
twice the amount of time i t  took to plan and complete the moon landing. My Recommendation 
today is consistent with the conclusion of the National Research Council of the National 
Academy of Sciences - a conclusion reached, not last week or last month, but 12 years ago. The 
Council noted "a worldwide scientific consensus that deep geological disposal, the approach 
being followed by the United States, is the best option for disposing of high-level radioactive 
waste."' Likewise. a broad spectrum of experts agrees that we now have enough information, 
including more than 20 years of researching Yucca Mountain specifically, to support a 
3 
conclusion that such a repository can be safely located there. 
Nonetheless, should this site designation ultimately become effective, considerable additional 
study lies ahead. Before an ounce of spent fuel or radioactive waste could be sent to Yucca 
' Rethinking High-Level Radioactire Waste Disposal: A Position S I ( I ~ P ~ I I C ~ I I  rfrhe Board on Radioactive Waste 
Muaugenrent, Washington. D.C.. National Academy Press. 1990. 
Letter and attached report. Charles G. Groat, Director, U.S. Genlopic Survcy. to Robert G. Card, October 4,2001 
(hereafter USGS Letter & Report); Letter and attached report, Hans Riottc. NEA-IAEA Joint Secretariat, to Lake H. 
Barrett, November 3. 2001 (hereafter NEA-IAEA Letter & Report):  Lctter. Charles V .  Shank, Director, Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory. to Spencer Abraham, September 6. 200 (hereafter Luwrence Berkeley National 
Laborator? Letter).  
Mountain, indeed even before construction of the permanent facilities for emplacement of waste 
could begin there, the Department of Energy (DOE or "the Department") will be required to 
submit an application to the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). There. DOE 
would be required to make its case through a formal review process that will include public 
hearings and is expected to last at least three years. Only after that, if the license were granted, 
could construction begin. The DOE would also have to obtain an additional operating license, 
supported by evidence that public health and safety will be preserved, before any waste could 
actually be received. 
In short, even if the Yucca Mountain Recommendation were accepted today, an estimated 
minimum of eight more years lies ahead before the site would become operational. 
We have seen decades of study, and properly so for a decision of this importance, one with 
significant consequences for so many of our citizens. As necessary, many more years of study 
will be undertaken. But i t  is past time to stop sacrificing that which is forward-looking and 
prudent on the altar of a stcttl4s quo we know ultimately will fail us. The status quo is not the 
best we can do for our energy future, our national security, our economy, our environment, and 
safety - and we are less safe every day as the clock runs down on dozens of older, temporary 
sites. 
I recommend the deep underground site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for development as our 
Nation's first permanent facility for disposing of high-level nuclear waste. 
* 2. Background 
2.1. History of the Yucca Mountain Project and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
The need for a secure facility in which to dispose of radioactive wastes has been known in this 
country at least since World War 11. As early as 1957. a National Academy of Sciences report to 
the Atomic Energy Commission suggested burying radioactive waste in geologic formations. 
Beginning in the 1970s. the United States and other countries evaluated many options for the 
safe and permanent disposal of radioactive waste. including deep seabed disposal, remote island 
siting, dry cask storage. disposal in the polar ice sheets. transmutation, and rocketing waste into 
orbit around the sun. After analyzing these options, disposal in a mined geologic repository 
emerged as the preferred long -term environmental solution for the management of these  waste^.^ 
Congress recognized this consensus 20 years ago when it  passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
of 1982. 
In the Act, Congress created a Federal obligation to accept civilian spent nuclear fuel and dispose 
of it in a geologic facility. Congress also designated the agencies responsible for implementing 
this policy and specified their roles. The Department of Energy must characterize, site, design, 
build, and manage a Federal waste repository. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
must set the public health standards for it. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission must license its 
construction, operation, and closure. 
- 
4 Frnal E11r.rrot1~1rnrcrl1n1pac.r Srnrrn~et~r))r Management of Cotr~nlercrnll\ Get~erared Ra(irocrctrve Waste, DOEiEIS- 0 0046. I980 
The Department of Energy began studying Yucca Mountain almost a quarter century ago. Even 
before Congress adopted the NWPA, the Department had begun national site screening research 
as part of the National Waste Terminal Storage program, which included examination of Federal 
sites that had previously been used for defense-related activities and were already potentially 
contaminated. Yucca Mountain was one such location. on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site, 
which was then under consideration. Work began on the Yucca Mountain site in 1978. When 
the NWPA was passed, the Department was studying more than 25 sites around the country as 
potential repositories. The Act provided for the siting and development of two; Yucca Mountain 
was one of nine sites under consideration for the first repository program. 
Following the provisions of the Act and the Department's siting ~uide1ines.l the Department 
prepared draft environmental assessments for the nine sites. Final environmental assessments 
were prepared for five of these, including Yucca Mountain. In 1986, the Department compared 
and ranked the sites under consideration for characterization. It did this by using a multi- 
attribute methodology - an accepted, formal scientific method used to help decision makers 
compare, on an equivalent basis, the many components that make up a complex decision. When 
all the components of the ranking decision were considered together, taking account of both pre- 
closure and post-closure concerns, Yucca Mountain was the top-ranked site.6 The Department 
examined a variety of ways of combining the components of the ranking scheme; this only 
confirmed the conclusion that Yucca Mountain came out in first place. The EPA also looked at 
the performance of a repository in unsaturated tuff .  The EPA noted that in its modeling in 
support of development of the standards, unsaturated tuff was one of the two geologic media that 
appeared most capable of limiting releases of radionuclides in a manner that keeps expected 6 doses to individuals low. 7 
In 1986, Secretary of Energy Herrington found three sites to be suitable for site characterization, 
and recommended the three, including Yucca Mountain, to President Reagan for detailed site 
characterizati~n.~ The Secretary also made a preliminary finding, based on Guidelines that did 
not require site characterization, that the three sites were suitable for development as 
repositories.9 
The next year, Congress amended the NWPA. and selected Yucca Mountain as the single site to 
be characterized. It simultaneously directed the Department to cease activities at all other 
potential sites. Although i t  has been suggested that Congress's decision was made for purely 
political reasons, the record described above reveals that the Yucca Mountain site consistently 
ranked at or near the top of the sites evaluated well before Congress's action. 
The Guidelines then in forcc were promulgated at 10 CFR part 960. General Guidelines for the Recommendation 
of Sites for Nuclear Wastc Repositories. 1984. 
6 Recontntet~datiot~ h\ the Secreton of Ettergx of Candidate Sites for Site Chc~racteri:ation for the First Radioactive 
Waste Repositon. DOWS-O(W8. May 1986. 
7 Environmenral Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High- 
Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes, Final Rule. 40 CFR Part 191, December 20, 1993. 
8 Letter, John S. Herrington. Secretary of Energy, to President Ronald Reagan, May 27, 1986, with attached report, 
Recommettdatiotl h\. the Secretan of Energy of Candidate Sitesfor Sire Ct1~1r(1cteri:atiottji7r the First Radioactive 
Waste Reposiron,. DOWS-0018. May 1 986. * ,hid. 
As previously noted, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences @ concluded in 1990 (and reiterated last year) that there is "a worldwide scientific consensus that 
deep geological disposal, the approach being followed by the United States, is the best option for 
disposing of high-level radioactive ~ a s t z . " ' ~  ~ o d a ~ ,  many national and international scientific 
experts and nuclear waste management professionals agree with DOE that there exists sufficient 
information to support a national decision on designation of the Yucca Mountain site." 
2.2. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the Responsibilities of the Department of Energy 
and the Secretary 
Congress assigned to the Secretary of Energy the primary responsibility for implementing the 
national policy of developing a deep underground repository. The Secretary must determine 
whether to initiate the next step laid out in the NWPA - a recommendation to designate Yucca 
Mountain as the site for development as a permanent disposal facility. The criteria for this 
determination are described more fully in section 5. Briefly, I first must determine whether 
Yucca Mountain is in fact technically and scientifically suitable to be a repository. A favorable 
suitability determination is indispensable for a positive recommendation of the site to the 
President. Under additional criteria I have adopted above and beyond the statutory requirements, 
I have also sought to determine whether, when other relevant considerations are taken into 
account, recommending it is in the overall national interest and, if so, whether there are 
countervailing arguments so strong that I should nonetheless decline to make the 
Recommendation. 
The Act contemplates several important stages in evaluating the site before a Secretarial 
recommendation is in order. It directs the Secretary to develop a site characterization plan, one 
that will help guide test programs for the collection of data to be used in evaluating the site. It 
directs the Secretary to conduct such characterization studies as may be necessary to evaluate the 
site's suitability. And it  directs the Secretary to hold hearings in the vicinity of the prospective 
site to inform the residents and receive their comments. It is at the completion of these stages 
that the Act directs the Secretary, if he finds the site suitable, to determine whether to 
recommend it to the President for development as a permanent repository. 
If the Secretary recommends to the President that Yucca Mountain be developed, he must 
include with the Recommendation, and make available to the. public, a comprehensive statement 
of the basis for his determination." If at any time the Secretary determines that Yucca Mountain 
is not a suitable site. he must report to Congress within six months his recommendations for 
further action to assure safe, permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 
waste. 
10 Rerhinkitlg High-Level Raclioacri\re Wasre Disposal: A Position Statenlenr cfrhe Board on Radioactive Waste 
Managenletl~, Washington, D.C.. National Academy Press, 1990. And: l>isposiriotl of High-Level Wasre and Spenr 
Nitclear Fuel: The Continuing Socieral and Technical Challenges. Board on Radioactive Waste Management, 
Washington. D.C.. National Academy Press, 2001. 
I I USGS Letter & Reporr, supra; NEA-IAEA Letter & Report, suprcr; Lrr~vrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
Letrer, suprcr. 
I ? This document iogether with accompanying materials comprise5 the recommendation and the comprehensive 
statement. The accompanying materials are described in footnote 26. 
@ 
Following a Recommendation by the Secretary. the President may recommend the Yucca 
Mountain site to Congress "if.. . [he] considers [it] qualified for application for a construction 
,el3 authorization.. . . If the President submits a recommendation to Congress, he must also submit 
a copy of the statement setting forth the basis for the Secretary's Recommendation. 
A Presidential recommendation takes effect 60 days after submission unless Nevada forwards a 
notice of disapproval to the Congress. If Nevada submits such a notice, Congress has a limited 
time during which it may nevertheless give effect to the President's recommendation by passing, 
under expedited procedures. a joint resolution of siting approval. If the President's 
recommendation takes effect, the Act directs the Secretary to submit to the NRC a construction 
license application. 
The NWPA by its terms contemplated that the entire process of siting, licensing, and 
constructing a repository would have been completed more than four years ago, by January 3 1, 
1998. Accordingly, i t  required the Department to enter into contracts to begin accepting waste 
for disposal by that date. 
3. Decision 
3.1. The Recommendation 
After over 20 years of research and billions of dollars of carefully planned and reviewed 
scientific field work, the Department has found that a repository at Yucca Mountain brings 
together the location, natural barriers, and design elements most likely to protect the health and 
safety of the public, including those Americans living in the immediate vicinity, now and long 
into the future. It is therefore suitable, within the meaning of the NWPA, for development as a 
permanent nuclear waste and spent fuel repository. 
After reviewing the extensive. indeed unprecedented, analysis the Department has undertaken, 
and in discharging the responsibilities made incumbent on the Secretary under the Act, I am 
recommending to the President that Yucca Mountain be developed as the Nation's first 
permanent, deep underground repository for high-level radioactive waste. A decision to develop 
Yucca Mountain will be a critical step forward in addressing our Nation's energy future, our 
national defense, our safety at home, and protection for our economy and environment. 
3.2. What This Recommendation Means, and What It Does Not Mean 
Even after so many years of research, this Recommendation is a preliminary step. It does no 
more than start the formal safety evaluation process. Before a license is granted, much less 
before repository construction or waste emplacement may begin, many steps and many years still 
lie ahead. The DOE must submit an application for a construction license; defend it through 
formal review, including public hearings; and receive authorization from the NRC, which has the 
statutory responsibility to ensure that any repository built at Yucca Mountain meets stringent 
" NWPA section I 14(a ) ( 2  )(A I .  
tests of health and safety. The NRC licensing process is expected to take a minimum of three 
years. Opposing viewpoints will have every opportunity to be heard. If the NRC grants this first 
license. i t  will only authorize initial construction. The DOE would then have to seek and obtain 
a second operating license from the NRC before any wastes could be received. The process 
altogether is expected to take a minimum of eight years. 
The DOE would also be subject to NRC oversight as a condition of the operating license. 
Construction, licensing, and operation of the repository would also be subject to ongoing 
Congressional oversight. 
At some future point, the repository is expected to close. EPA and NRC regulations require 
monitoring after the DOE receives a license amendment authorizing the closure, which would be 
from 50 to about 300 years after waste emplacement begins, or possibly longer. 
The repository would also be designed, however, to be able to adapt to methods future 
generations might develop to manage high-level radioactive waste. Thus, even after completion 
of waste emplacement, the waste could be retrieved to take advantage of its economic value or 
usefulness to as yet undeveloped technologies. 
Permanently closing the repository would require sealing all shafts, ramps, exploratory 
boreholes, and other underground openings connected to the surface. Such sealing would 
discourage human intrusion and prevent water from entering through these openings. DOE'S site 
stewardship would include maintaining control of the area, monitoring and testing, and 
implementing security measures against vandalism and theft. In addition, a network of 
permanent monuments and markers would be erected around the site to alert future generations 
to the presence and nature of the buried waste." Detailed public records held in multiple places 
would identify the location and layout of the repository and the nature and potential hazard of the 
waste it contains. The Federal Government would maintain control of the site for the indefinite 
future. Active security systems would prevent deliberate or inadvertent human intrusion and any 
other human activity that could adversely affect the performance of the repository. 
4. Decision Determination Methodology and the Decision-Making Process 
I have considered many kinds of information in making my determination today. I have put on a 
hard hat, gone down into the Mountain, and spoken with many of the scientists and engineers 
working there. Of course my decision-making included a great deal more than that. I have also 
personally reviewed detailed summaries of the science and research undertaken by the Yucca 
Mountain Project since 1978. I relied upon review materials, program evaluations, and face-to- 
face briefings given by many individuals familiar with the Project, such as the acting program 
manager and program senior staff. 
My consideration included: (a) the general background of the program, including the relevant 
legislative history; (b)  the types, sources, and amounts of radioactive waste that would be 
disposed of at the site and their risk; (c) the extent of Federal responsibilities; (d) the criteria for a 
I4 During characteriration of the Yucca Mountain site. Nye County began to develop its Early Warning Monitoring 
0 program and horcholcs. These horeholes not only provide information about water movement in the area of the site, but also can serve as rnonitor~ng points should a repository be built at Yucca Mountain. 
suitability decision, including the NWPA's provisions bearing on the basis for the Secretary's 
consideration; the regulatory structure, its substance, history, and issues; DOE'S Yucca Mountain 
Suitability Guidelines promulgated under the NWPA:" the NRC licensing regulations,16 and 
EPA radiation protection standards" as referenced in the Suitability Guidelines; (e) assessments 
of repository performance, including technical data and descriptions of how those data were 
gathered and evaluated; assessments of the effectiveness of natural and engineered barriers in 
meeting applicable radiation protection standards, and adjustments for uncertainties associated 
with each of these; (f) the Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Evaluation; (g) the views of members 
of the public, including those expressed at hearings and through written comments; (h) 
environmental, socioeconomic, and transportation issues; ( i )  program oversight history, technical 
issues, and responses, including the role and views of the NRC. the Nuclear Waste Technical 
Review Board, the General Accounting Office, the Inspector General, and the State of Nevada; 
and the role and views of the National Laboratories. the United States Geological Survey, and 
peer reviews; and ti) public policy impact. 
I also requested an external review of program briefing materials. It was conducted by Dr. Chris 
Whipple, a member of the National Academy of Engineering and an experienced independent 
peer reviewer of programs for both the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and the Yucca Mountain 
Project. Dr. Whipple previously had led a peer review team that critically analyzed Total System 
Performance Assessment (TSPA) work of the Yucca Mountain Project. 
I also reviewed the comment summary documents from both the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) and NWPA Section 114 site recommendation hearing process in order fully to 
take into account public views concerning a possible recommendation of the Yucca Mountain 
site. This review enabled me to evaluate scientific and research results in the context of both 
strongly held local concerns and issues of national importance. I took particular note of 
comments and concerns raised by the Governor of Nevada, governors of other states, state 
agencies, Native American tribes, and members of the public at large. 
5. Decision Criteria 
My charge to make a recommendation to the President on this matter stems from the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1982. That statute directs the Secretary of Energy to determine "whether to 
recommend to the President that he approve [the Yucca Mountain] site for development of a 
repository."'x The NWPA establishes certain guideposts along the way to making this 
determination, but it also gives the Secretary significant responsibility for deciding what the 
relevant considerations are to be. 
Pursuant to that responsibility, I concluded that I should use three criteria in determining whether 
to recommend approval of the Yucca Mountain Project. First, is Yucca Mountain a scientifically 
'' I0 CFR Part 963. Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines. November 14, 2001. 
16 10 CFR Part 63. Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste in a Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada, November 2.2001. 
17 40 CFR Part 197. Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 
June 13,2001. a NWPA section I 14(a)( I )  
and technically suitable site for a repository. i .e . .  a site that promises a reasonable expectation of 
@ public health and safety for disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste for the next 10,000 years? Second, are there compelling national interests that favor proceeding 
with the decision to site a repository there? And third, are there countervailing considerations 
that outweigh those interests? 
The first of these criteria is expressly contemplated by the NWPA, although the NWPA also 
confers considerable discretion and responsibility on the Secretary in defining how to determine 
scientific and technical suitability and in making a judgment on the question. The two other 
criteria are not specified by the NWPA, but I am convinced that they are appropriate checks on a 
pure suitability-based decision. 
5.1. Scientific and Technical Suitability 
Under the NWPA, the first step in a Secretarial determination regarding Yucca Mountain is 
deciding whether i t  is scientifically and technically suitable as a repository site. Although the 
NWPA does not state explicitly that this is the initial step. the language and structure of the Act 
strongly suggest that this is so. Most significantly. section 1 14(a)(l) of the NWPA states that the 
Secretary's recommendation is to be made at the conclusion of site chara~terization.'~ Section 
113, in turn, makes clear that the function of site characterization is to provide enou h site- 4 
specific information to allow a decision on Yucca Mountain's scientific suitability. 
As to what a determination of site suitability entails. the only real guidance the Act provides is 
that in several places it equates a favorable suitability judgment with a judgment that a re ository @ could (1) be built at that site and (2) receive a construction authorization from the NRC." This 
suggests that a determination that the site is suitable entails a judgment on my part that a 
repository at Yucca Mountain would likely be licensable by the NRC. 
Beyond that, the NWPA largely leaves the question to the Secretary of Energy by charging him 
with establishing "criteria to be used to determine the suitability of ... candidate site[s] for the 
location of a repository."" On November 14. 2001. following NRC's concurrence, the 
Department issued its final version of these criteria in a rule entitled, "Yucca Mountain Site 
Suitability Guidelines." I shall describe these in detail in the next section of this 
Recommendation, but outline them here. In brief. DOE'S Guidelines envision that 1 may find the 
Yucca Mountain site suitable if  I conclude that a repository constructed there is "likely" to meet 
I91bid. 
20 This is apparent from two related provisions of  section I I?: section I 13(c)(l), which states that, "The Secretary 
may conduct at the Yucca Mountain sitc only such site charactcr~zation activities as the Secretary considers 
necessary to provide the data required for evaluation of the suitahility of such site fnr an application to be submitted 
to the Commission for a construction authorization for a repository at such site" (as well as for NEPA purposes); and 
its companion provision. section II?(c)(3),  which states that. "If the Sccrctary at any time determines the Yucca 
Mountain sitc to bc unsuitable for development a$ a repository. the Sccrctary shall ... terminate all site 
characterization activities I there]." 
" NWPA section 112(h)( l )(D)(ii); NWPA section I13(c)(l); NWPA section 113(c)(?). 
"NWPA section I 13(b)( 1 )lA)(iv). That section contemplates that thcse criteria are to he included in the first 
instance in the silt charac~erization plan for each site and thereafter may he modified using the procedures of section 
extremely stringent radiation protection standards designed to protect public health and safety.'" 
The EPA originally established these  standard^.^' They are now also set out in NRC licensing 
rules." 
The EPA and NRC adopted the standards so as to assure that while the repository is receivi~g 
nuclear materials, any radiation doses to workers and members of the public in the vicinity of the 
site would be at safe levels, and that after the repository is sealed, radiation doses to those in the 
vicinity would be at safe levels for 10,000 years. These radiation protection levels are identical 
to those with which the DOE will have to demonstrate compliance to the satisfaction of the NRC 
in order to obtain a license to build the repository. 
Using the Department's suitability Guidelines. I have concluded that Yucca Mountain is in fact 
suitable for a repository. The reasons for this conclusion are set out in section 7 of this 
Recommendation. However, I want to pause to make one thing clear at the outset. If for any 
reason I found that the site were not suitable or licensable, then, irrespective of any other 
consideration, I would not recommend it. Specifically, however much as I might believe that 
proceeding toward a repository would advance the national interest in other ways, those 
additional considerations could not properly influence, and have not influenced, my 
determination of suitability. 
5.2. National Interest Considerations 
Beyond scientific suitability, the NWPA is virtually silent on what other standard or standards 
the Secretary should apply in making a recommendation. It does direct me to consider certain 
matters. It requires that I consider the record of hearings conducted in the vicinity of Yucca 
Mountain, the site characterization record, and various other information I am directed to 
transmit to the President with my ~ecommendation. '~ The Act does not, however, specify how I 
'3 10 CFR part 963. 
" 40 CFR part 197. 
25 10 CFR part 63. 
'?he statutorily required information is set out in Section I I-l(a)(l ) ofthe NWPA, which states: 
Together with any recommendation of a site under this paragraph. thc Secretary shall make available to the public, 
and submit to the President. a comprehensive statement of the bas; of such recommendation, including the 
following: 
(A) a description of the proposed rcpository, including preliminary engineering specifications for the facility; 
(B) a description of the waste form or packaging proposed for use at such repository, and an explanation of the 
relationship between such waste forrn or packaging and the geologic medium of such site; 
(C) a discussion of data. obtained in site characterization activities. relating to the safety of such site; 
(D) a final environmental impact statement prepared for the Yucca Mountain site pursuant to subsection (f) and the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 432 1 et seq.], together with comments made concerning such 
environmental impact statement by the Secretary of the Interior, the Council on Environmental Quality, the 
Administrator, and the Commission. except that the Secretary shall not be required in any such environmental 
impact statement to consider the need for a repository. the alternatives to geological disposal, or alternative sites to 
the Yucca Mountain site; 
(E) preliminary comments of the Commission concerning the extent to which the at-depth site characterization 
analysis and the waste form proposal for such site seem to be suflicient for inclusion i n  any application to be 
submitted by the Secretary for licensing of such site as a repository; 
a (F) the views and comments of the Governor and legislature of any State. or the governing body of any affected Indian tribe. as determined by the Secretary. together with the response of'the Secretary to such views; 
am to consider these various items or what standard I am to use in weighing them. And finally 
among the items it directs me to take into account is, "such other information as the Secretary 
considers appropriate." 
The approach taken in the Act led me to conclude that, after completing the first step of reaching 
a judgment as to the scientific suitability of Yucca Mountain, if I concluded the site was 
scientifically suitable, I should also address a second matter: whether it is in the overall national 
interest to build a repository there. In considering that issue, I have addressed two further 
questions: are there compelling national interests favoring development of the site, and if so, are 
there countervailing considerations weighty enough to overcome the arguments for proceeding 
with development? Sections 8 and 9 of this Recommendation set forth my conclusions on these 
questions. 
In my view, the statute's silence on the factors that go into the recommendation process makes it 
at a minimum ambiguous on whether I should conduct any inquiry beyond the question of 
scientific suitability. In light of that ambiguity, I have elected to construe the statute as allowing 
me, if 1 make a favorable suitability determination based on science, also to consider whether 
development of a repository at Yucca Mountain is in the national interest. For several reasons, I 
believe this is the better way to interpret the NWPA. First, given the significance of a siting 
(G)  such other information as the Secretary considers appropriate; and 
(H) any impact report submitted under section 1 16(c)(2)(B) 142 U.S.C. 10136(c)(2)(B)] by the State of Nevada. 
This material is attached to this Recommendation. as follows: 
The description of the repository called for by section 1 14(a)( 1 )(A) is contained in Chapter 2 of the Yucca 
Mountain Science and Engineering Report (YMS&ER), Revision 1 .  
The material relating to the waste form called for by section 114(a)(l)(B) is contained in Chapters 3 and 4 
of the YMS&ER, Revision 1 .  
The discussion of site characterization data called for by section I 14(a)(l)(C) is contained in Chapter 4 of 
the YMS&ER. Revision I .  
The EIS-related material called for by section 1 14(a)(l )(D) is contained in the Final Envirot~nlental Impact 
Statenlerzt (EIS) for a Geologic Repositon,Ji,r the Dispostrl of Sprmt Nilclear Fuel and High-Level 
Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain. Nye Colrng. Nesnda, along with letters received from the Secretary 
of the Interior. the Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality, the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency. and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), transmitting their 
respective comments on the final EIS. 
The information called for by section 1 14(a)( l )(E) is contained in a letter from NRC Chairman Meserve to 
Under Secretary Card. dated November 13. 200 1 .  
The information called for by section I 14(a)( I )(F) is contained in Section 2 of two separate reports, the 
Conlnletlt Slcnlnlan Docunretlt and the Slrpplet~rent~~l Cornt~let~t Srrtnt~~un Doclrnlent, and in a separate 
document providing responses to comments from the Governor of Nevada sent to the Department after the 
public comment periods on a possible site recommendation closed. 
Section 1 14(a)( l )(G) provides for the inclusion of other information as the Secretary considers appropriate. 
The report. Ylrcca Morttltait~ Site Suitability E~*aluntion (DOERW-0549. February 2002), has been 
included as other information. This report provides an evaluation of the suitability of the Yucca Mountain 
site against Departmental Guidelines setting forth the criteria and methodology to be used in determining 
the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site, pursuant to section 1 13(h)(l )(A)(iv). In addition, impact reports 
submitted by the various Nevada counties have been included as other information to be forwarded to the 
President. In transmitting these reports to the President, the Department is neither deciding on, nor 
endorsing, any specific impact assistance requested by the governmental entities in those reports. 
The State o f  Nevada subm~tted an impact report pursuant to section I 14(a)(l )(H). In transmitting this 
report to the President. the Department is likewise neither deciding on. nor endorsing this report. 
decision and the nature of the officers involved, one would expect that even if a Cabinet 
Secretary were to find a site technically suitable for a repository, he should be able to take 
broader considerations into account in determining what recommendation to make to the 
President. A pure suitability-based decision risks talung insufficient heed of the views of the 
people, particularly in Nevada but in other parts of the country as well. Second, it is difficult to 
envision a Cabinet Secretary's making a recommendation without taking into account these 
broader considerations. Finally, i t  is plain that any conclusion on whether to recommend this site 
is likely to be reviewed by Congress. Since that review will inevitably focus on broader 
questions than the scientific and technical suitability of the site, it seems useful in the first 
instance for the Executive Branch to factor such considerations into its recommendation as well. 
I note, however, that if my interpretation of the statute in this regard is incorrect, and Congress 
has made a finding of suitability the sole determinant of whether to recommend Yucca 
Mountain. my Recommendation would be the same. 
6. Is Yucca Mountain Scientifically and Technically Suitable for Development of a 
Repository? 
The Department of Energy has spent over two decades and billions of dollars on carefully 
planned and reviewed scientific fieldwork designed to help determine whether Yucca Mountain 
is a suitable site for a repository. The results of that work are summarized in the Yucca 
Mountain Science arzd Erzgirreerirlg Report, Revision I ,  and evaluated in the Yucca Mountain 
Site Suitability Evaluation (YMSSE), which concludes, as set out in 10 CFR part 963, that Yucca 
Mountain is "likely" to meet the applicable radiation standards and thus to protect the health and 
safety of the public, including those living in the immediate vicinity now and thousands of years 
from now. I have carefully studied that evaluation and much of the material underlying it, and I 
believe it to be correct. 
6.1. Framework for Suitability Determination 
The general outline of the analytic framework I have used to evaluate the scientific suitability of 
the site is set out in the Department's Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines, found at 10 
CFR part 963. 
The framework has three key features. First, the Guidelines divide the suitability inquiry into 
sub-inquiries concerning a "pre-closure" safety evaluation and a "post-closure" performance 
evaluation. The "pre-closure" evaluation involves assessing whether a repository at the site is 
likely to be able to operate safely while it  is open and receiving wastes. The "post-closure" 
evaluation involves assessing whether the repository is likely to continue to isolate the materials 
for 10,000 years after i t  has been sealed, so as to prevent harmful releases of radionuclides. 
Second, the Guidelines set out a method and criteria for conducting the pre-closure safety 
evaluation. The method is essentially the same as that used to evaluate the safety of other 
proposed nuclear facilities; it is not particularly novel and should be recognized by those familiar 
with safety assessments of existing facilities. This is because, while it  is open and receiving 
nuclear materials, a repository at Yucca Mountain will not be very different, in terms of its 
functions and the activities expected to takc place there, from many other modern facilities built 
to handle such materials. A pre-closure evaluaion to assess the probable sdety of such a facility 
entails considering its design, the nature of the substances it handles, and the kinds of activities 
and external events that might occur while i t  is receiving waste. It then uses known data to 
forecast the level of radioactivity to which workers and members of the public would be likely to 
be exposed as a result. 
Third, the Guidelines set out a method and criteria for evaluating the post-closure performance of 
the repository. This is the most challenging aspect of evaluating Yucca Mountain's suitability, 
since it entails assessing the ability of the repository to isolate radioactive materials far into the 
future. The scientific consensus is, and the Guidelines specify, that this should be done using a 
"Total System Performance Assessment." This approach, which is similar to other efforts to 
forecast the behavior of complex systems over long periods of time, takes information derived 
from a multitude of experiments and known facts. It feeds that information into a series of 
models. These in turn are used to develop one overarching model of how well a repository at 
Yucca Mountain would be likely to perform in preventing the escape of radioactivity and 
radioactive materials. The model can then be used to forecast the levels of radioactivity to which 
people near the repository might be exposed 10.000 years or more after the repository is sealed." 
6.1.2. Radicitiotz Prorectiotz Standards 
A key question to be answered. as part of any suitability determination is, "What level of 
* radiation exposure is acceptable?" 
27 The selection of the 10.000-year compliance period for the individual-protection standard involves both technical 
and policy considerations. EPA weighed both during the rulemaking for 40 CFR Part 197. EPA considered policy 
and technical factors. as well as the experience of other EPA and international programs. First, EPA evaluated the 
policies for managing risks from the disposal of both long lived, hazardous. nonradioactive materials and radioactive 
materials. Second. EPA cvaluatcd consistency with both 40 CFR Part 191 and the issue of consistent time periods 
for the protection of groundwater resources and public health. Third. EPA considered the issue of uncertainty in 
predicting dose over the \,cry long pcriods contemplated in the alternative of peak dose within the period of geologic 
stability. Finally. EPA reviewed the feasibility of implementin,o the alternative of peak risk within the period of 
geologic stability. 
As a result of thcsc considcrations. EPA established a IO.O(K)-year compliance period with a quantitative limit and a 
requirement t o  calculate the pcak dosc. using performance assessments. if the peak dose occurs after 10,000 years. 
Under this approach. DOE must make the performance asxssmcnt results for the post- 10,000-year period part of the 
public record by including them in the EIS for Yucca Mountain. 
The relevance of a IO.000-year compliance period can also he understotxf by examining hazard indices that compare 
the potential risk of released radionuclidcs to other risks. One such analysis, presented in the-Firzal Erlvironmental 
Impact Statenrentfi)r the Mrrnn,yemenr of Commerciull!~ Ctvrc,rrrred Radioactive Waste, DOEtEIS-0046F, examined 
the relative amounts of water required to bring the concentration of a substance to allowable drinking water 
standards. The relative hazard for spent fuel compared to the toxicity of the ore used to produce the reactor fuel at 
one year after removal of the spent fuel from the reactor is about the same hazard as a rich mercury ore. The hazard 
index is about the same as average mercury ores at about 80 years. By 200 years the hazard index is about the same 
as average lead ore; by I .OOO years i t  is comparable to a silver ore. The relative hazard index is about the same as 
the uranium ore that i t  came from at 10,000 years. This is not to suggest that the wastes from spent fuel are not 
toxic. However. i t  is suggested that where concern for the toxicity of the ore bodies is not great. the spent fuel 
should cause no geater concern. particularly if placed within multiple engineered barriers in geologic formations, at 
* least as, if not more. remote from the biosphere than these common ores. 
DOE'S Site Suitability Guidelines use as their benchmark the levels the NRC has specified for 8 purposes of deciding whether to license a repository at Yucca Mountain. The NRC, in turn, 
established these levels on the basis of radiation protection standards set by the EPA. The 
standards generally require that during pre-closure, the repository facilities, operations, and 
controls restrict radiation doses to less than 15 millirem a year'x to a member of the public in its 
vicinity.'9 During post-closure, they generally require that the maximum radiation dose allowed 
to someone living in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain be no more than 15 millirem per year, and 
no more than four millirem per year from certain radionuclides in the groundwater?0 
This level of radiation exposure is comparable to, or less than, ordinary variations in natural 
background radiation that people typically experience each year. It is also less than radiation 
levels to which Americans are exposed in the course of their everyday lives - in other words, 
radiation "doses" to which people generally give no thought at all. 
To understand this, i t  is important to remember that radiation is part of the natural world and that 
we are exposed to it all the time. Every day we encounter radiation from space in the form of 
cosmic rays. Every day we are also exposed to terrestrial radiation, emitted from naturally 
radioactive substances in the earth's surface. 
In addition to natural background radiation from these sources. people are exposed to radiation 
from other everyday sources. These include X-rays and other medical procedures, and consumer 
goods (e.g., television sets and smoke detectors). 
a Americans, on average, receive an annual radiation exposure of 360 millirem from their 
surroundings. The 15 millirem dose the EPA standard set as the acceptable annual exposure 
from the repository is thus slightly over four percent of what we receive every year right now. 
28 Risk to human beings from radiation is due to its ioni~ing effccts. Radionuclides found in nature, commercial 
products, and nuclear waste emit ionizing radiation. Thc forms of lonixing radiation differ in their penetrating 
power or energy and in the manner in which they affect human tissue. Some ionizing radiation, known as alpha 
radiation, can be stopped by a sheet of paper. but may hc \,cry harmful i f  inhaled, ingested or otherwise admitted 
into the body. Long-lived radioactive elements, with atomic numbers higher than 92, such as plutonium, emit alpha 
radiation. Other ionizing radiation. known as beta rad~ation. can penetrate the skin and can cause serious effects if 
emitted from an inhaled or ingested radionuclide. The ioni/.ing radiation with the greatest penetrating power is 
gamma radiation: i t  can penetrate and damage critical organ5 in the body. Fission products can emit both gamma 
and beta radiation depending on the radionuclides present. In high-level nuclear waste, beta and gamma radiation 
emitters, such as cesium and strontium. present the grealest hazard for the first 300 to 1.000 years, by which time 
they have decayed. After that time. the alpha-emitting radionuclides prcscnt the greatest hazard. 
Radiation doses can be correlated to potential biologic effccts and are measured in a unit called a rem. Doses are 
often expressed in terms of thousandths of a rem, or mill~rcm (mrem); the internationally used unit is the Sievert (S), 
which is equivalent to I00 rem. 
'9 The NRC regulations also require that the annual dose to workers there hc less than 5 rem. See 10 CFR part 63, 
referencing I O  CFR part 20. This is the general standard for c~cupational cxposure that applies in numerous other 
settings, such as operating nuclear facilities. 
30 During both pre- and post-closure, the NRC licensing rules. 10 CFR part 63. also contain a number of more 
particularized standards for specific situations. These are referenced In the results tables contained in the following 
sections. Pursuant to EPA's groundwater standard, 40 CFR part 197. they also contain concentration limits on 
certain kinds of radionuclides that may be present in the water. whether or not their presence is attributable to a 
potential repository. These are also referenced in the results tablcb. 
Moreover, background radiation varies from one location to another due to many natural and @ man-made factors. At higher elevations, the atmosphere provides less protection from cosmic 
rays, so background radiation is higher. In the United States. this variation can be 50 or more 
millirem. Thus, if the repository generates radiation doses sec as the benchmark in the 
Guidelines, the incremental radiation dose a person living in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain 
would receive from it would be about the same level of increase in radiation exposure as a 
person would experience as a result of moving from Philadelphia to Denver. 
Ordinary air travel is another example. Flying at typical cross-country altitudes results in 
increased exposure of about one-half millirem per hour. If the Yucca Mountain repository 
generates radiation at the 15 millirem benchmark. it  would increase the exposure of those living 
near it to about the same extent as if they took three round trip flights between the East Coast and 
Las Vegas. 
Rocks and soil also affect natural background radiation, particularly if the rocks are igneous or 
the soils derived from igneous rock, which can contain radioactive potassium, thorium, or 
uranium. In these cases, the variation in the background radiation is frequently in the tens of 
millirem or higher. Wood contains virtually no naturally occurring radioactive substances that 
contribute to radiation exposures. but bricks and concrete made from crushed rock and soils 
often do. Living or working in structures made from these materials can also result in tens of 
millirem of increased exposure to radiation. Thus, if the repository generates radiation at the 
levels in the Guidelines' benchmark. it is likely to result in less additional exposure to a person 
a living in its vicinity than if  he moved from a wood house to a brick house. 
Finally, i t  is noteworthy that the radiation protection standards referenced by the Guidelines are 
based on those selected by the NRC for licensing the repository. They in turn relied on the EPA 
rule establishing these as the appropriate standards for the site. The NRC and EPA acted 
pursuant to specific directives in the NWPA. in which Congress first assigned to the EPA the 
responsibility to set these standards, and later in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which directed 
the EPA to act in conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences and develop a standard 
specifically for Yucca Mountain. The EPA carefully considered the question of how to do so. 
The 15 millirem per year standard is the same i t  has applied to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in 
New ~ e x i c o . "  And i t  is well within the National Academy of Sciences-recommended range, a 
range developed in part by referring to guidelines from national and international advisory 
bodies and regulations in other developed countries? 
For all these reasons, there is every cause to believe that a repository that can meet the 15 
millirem radiation protection standard will be fully protective of the health and safety of 
11 
residents living in the vicinity of the repository. 
j' ~ O C F R  p r t  191. 
32 Techtziccrl Basrsfor Y i r c x u  Moutltaitl Stut~dards, National Academy o f  Sciences. National Research Councll. 
1995. 
j3 As noted above. the EPA, in 4 0  CFR part 197, also established groundwater protection standards in the Yucca 
Mountain rule; these are compatible with drinking water standards applied elsewhere in the United States, and apply 
maximum contaminant levels. as well as a 4 mrernlyr dose standard. 
6.1.3. Underlying Hard Science 
As explained in section 6.1.1, the Guidelines contemplate the use of models and analyses to 
project whether the repository will meet the 15 millirem dose ~tandard. '~  To have confidence in 
the model results, however, it is important to understand the kind of science chat went into 
constructing them. 
For over 20 years, scientists have been investigating every aspect of the natural processes - past, 
present and future - that could affect the ability of a repository beneath Yucca Mountain to 
isolate radionuclides emitted from nuclear materials emplaced there. They have been conducting 
equally searching investigations into the processes that would allow them to understand the 
behavior of the engineered barriers - principally the waste "packages" (more nearly akin to 
vaults) - that are expected to contribute to successful waste isolation. These investigations have 
run the gamut, from mapping the geological features of the site, to studying the repository rock, 
to investigating whether and how water moves through the Mountain. To give just a few 
examples: 
At the surface of the repositow: 
Yucca Mountain scientists have mapped geologic structures, including rock units, faults, 
fractures, and volcanic features. To do this.,they have excavated more than 200 pits and 
trenches to remove alluvial material or weathered rock to be able to observe surface and 
near-surface features directly, as well as to understand what events and processes have 
occurred or might occur at the Mountain. 
They have drilled more than 450 surface boreholes and collected over 75,000 feet of geologic 
core samples and some 18,000 geologic and water samples. They used the information 
obtained to identify rock and other formations beneath the surface, monitor infiltration of 
moisture, measure the depth of the water table and properties of the hydrologic system, 
observe the rate at which water moves from the surface into subsurface rock, and determine 
air and water movement properties above the water table. 
They have conducted aquifer testing at sets of wells to determine the transport and other 
properties of the saturated zone below Yucca Mountain. These tests included injecting easily 
identified groundwater tracers in one well, which were then detected in another; this helped 
scientists understand how fast water moves. 
They have conducted tectonic field studies to evaluate extensions of the earth's crust and the 
probability of seismic events near Yucca Mountain. 
Underground: 
The Department's scientists have conducted a massive project to probe the area under the 
Mountain's surface where the repository will be built. 
They constructed a five mile-long main underground tunnel, the Exploratory Studies Facility, 
to provide access to the specific rock type that would be used for the repository. This main 
tunnel is adjacent to the proposed repository block, about 800 feet underground. After 
completing the main tunnel, they excavated a second tunnel, 1 .&miles long and 16.5 feet in 
diameter. This tunnel, referred to as the Cross-Drift tunnel, runs about 45 feet above and 
across the repository block. 
They then mapped the geologic features such as faults, fractures, stratigraphic units, mineral 
compositions, etc., exposed by the underground openings in the tunnels. 
They collected rock samples to determine geotechnical properties. 
They conducted a drift-scale thermal test to observe the effects of heat on the hydrologic, 
mechanical, and chemical properties of the rock, and chemical properties of the water and 
gas liberated as a result of heating. The four yearlong heating cycle of the drift-scale test was 
the largest known heater test in history, heating some seven million cubic feet of rock over its 
ambient temperature. This test also included samples of engineered materials to determine 
corrosion resistance in simulated repository conditions. 
In various laboratory-based studies: 
Yucca Mountain scientists have supplemented with laboratory work the surface and underground 
tests previously described. 
They have tested mechanical, chemical, and hydrologic properties of rock samples in support 
of repository design and development of natural process models. 
They have tested radionuclides to determine solubility and colloid formation that affect their 
transport if released. 
They have tested over 13,000 engineered material samples to determine their corrosion 
resistance in a variety of environments. 
They have determined the chemical properties of water samples and the effects of heat on the 
behavior and properties of water in the host rock. 
The findings from these numerous studies were used to develop computer simulations that 
describe the natural features, events, and processes that exist at Yucca Mountain or that could be 
changed as the result of waste disposal. The descriptions in turn were used to develop the 
models discussed in the next section to project the likely radiation doses from the repository. 
7. Results of Suitability Evaluations and Conclusions 
* As explained above. the Guidelines contemplate that the Secretary will evaluate the suitability of 
the Yucca Mountain site for a repository on two separate bases. 
The Guidelines first contemplate that I will determine whether the site is suitable for a repository 
during the entire pre-closure or operational period, assumed to be from 50 to 300 years after 
emplacement of nuclear materials begins. To answer this question, the Guidelines ask me to 
determine whether, while it is operating, the repository is likely to result in annual radiation 
doses to people in the vicinity and those working there that will fall below the dosage levels set 
in the radiation protection standards." The Guidelines contemplate that I will use a pre-closure 
safety evaluation to guide my response.36 
Second, the Guidelines contemplate that I will determine whether the repository is suitable - in 
other words, may reasonably be expected to be safe - after it has been sealed. To answer that 
question, the Guidelines ask me to determine whether it is likely that the repository will continue 
to isolate radionuclides for 10,000 years after i t  is sealed, so that an individual living 18 
kilometers (1  1 miles) from the repositor is not exposed to annual radiation doses above those 7, 
set in the radiation protection standards.' The Guidelines contemplate that I will use a Total 
System Performance Assessment to guide my response to this question.38 
The Department has completed both the Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation and TSPA called for by 
the Guidelines. These project that a repository at Yucca Mountain will result in radioactive 
doses well below the applicable radiation protection standards. As I explain below, I have 
reviewed these projections and the bases for them, and I believe them to be well founded. I also 
believe both the Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation and the Total System Performance Assessment 
have properly considered the criteria set out in the Guidelines for each period. Using these 
evaluations as set out in the ~uidelines," I believe i t  is likely that a repository at Yucca 
Mountain will result in radiation doses below the radiation protection standards for both periods. 
Accordingly, I believe Yucca Mountain is suitable for the development of a repository. 
7.1. Results of Pre-Closure Evaluations 
As explained in section 6.1.1, the Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation method I have employed is 
commonly used to assess the likely performance of planned or prospective nuclear facilities. 
Essentially what i t  involves is evaluating whether the contemplated facility is designed to 
prevent or mitigate the effects of possible accidents. The facility will be considered safe if its 
design is likely to result in radioactive releases below those set in the radiation protection 
standards. 





The Department has conducted such a Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation, which is summarized in 
the Yucca Mountain Science and Engineering Report, Revision 1."' In conducting this 
evaluation, the Department considered descriptions of how the site will be laid out, the surface 
facilities, and the underground facilities and their operations. It also considered a series of 
potential hazards, including, for example. seismic activity, flooding, and severe winds, and their 
consequences. Finally, it considered preliminary descriptions of how components of the 
facilities' design would prevent or mitigate the effects of accidents. 
The Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation concluded that the preliminary design would prevent or 
dramatically mitigate the effects of accidents, and that the repository would therefore not result 
in radioactive releases that would lead to exposure levels above those set by the radiation 
protection standards. I t  considered the pre-closure criteria of 10 CFR 963.14 in reaching this 
conclusion. In particular. i t  found that the preliminary design has the ability to contain and limit 
releases of radioactive materials; the ability to implement control and emergency systems to limit 
exposures to radiation; the ability to maintain a system and components that perform their 
intended safety functions; and the ability to preserve the option to retrieve wastes during the pre- 
closure period. The annual doses of radiation to which the Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation 
projected individuals in the vicinity of the repository and workers would be exposed are set out 
in the following table. These doses fall well below the levels that the radiation protection 
standards establish. 
I have carefully reviewed the Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation and find its conclusions persuasive. 
I am therefore convinced that a repository can be built at Yucca Mountain that will operate safely 
a without harming those in the repository's vicinity during the pre-closure period. Finally, I would note that although many aspects of this project are controversial, there is no controversy of which 
I am aware concerning this aspect of the Department's conclusions. This stands to reason. The 
kinds of activities that would take place at the repository during the pre-closure period - 
essentially, the management and handling of nuclear materials including packaging and 
emplacement in the repository - are similar to the kinds of activities that at present go on every 
day, and have gone on for years, at temporary storage sites around the country. These activities 
are conducted safely at those sites, and no one has advanced a plausible reason why they could 
not be conducted equally i f  not more safely during pre-closure operations at a new, state-of-the- 
art facility at Yucca Mountain. 
That is not an insignificant point. since the pre-closure period will last at least 50 years after the 
start of emplacement, which will begin at the earliest eight years from today. Moreover, the 
Department's Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation also assumed a possible alternative pre-closure 
period of 300 years from the beginning of emplacement, and its conclusions remained 
unchanged. Thus. the Department's conclusion that the repository can operate safely for the next 
300 years - or for about three generations longer than the United States has existed - has not 
been seriously questioned. 
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T a b l e  1. S u m m a r y  P r e - C l o s u r e  Dose Performance Criteria and E v a l u a t i o n  ~ e s u l t s ~ '  
Results Standard 
Pre-closure standard: 10 CFR 63.204, 
referenced in I0 CFR 963.2; 
Pre-Closure Performance Objective for normal 
operations and Category 1 event sequences per 
10 CFR 63.11 1(a)(2), referenced in I0 CFR 
I radioactive material to the environment (not a I 10 1 0.06 mredyrb I 
Public Exposuresa 
Limits 
15 mrem/yrh 0.06 mredyrb 
963.2 I 
Constraint specified for air emissions of 
dose limitation): 10 CFR 20.1 101 (d)' 
Dose limits for individual member of the public 
for normal operations and Category 1 event 
sequences: 10 CFR 20.130 1' 
Pre-Closure Performance Objective for any 
Category 2 event sequence: i 0  CFR 
63.11 1(b)(2), referenced in 10 CFR 963.2 
100 mredYrb'* 
2 mredhr  in any unrestricted area 
from external sources 
5 rcmh 
15 rem lens of the eye dose 
I I I 15 r e d y r  lens ofthe eye dose 0.15 r e d y r  
0.06 mredyrb 
<<2 mredhr  
0.02 remb 
5 0  rem organ or tissue dose 




Occupational Dose Limits for Adults from 
normal operational emissions and Category 1 
event sequences: 10 CFR 20.120 1 ' 
I Routine Occupational Dose Limits for Adults: I 5 rendyrh 1 0.06 to 0.79 r e d y r b  I 
50 rem skin dose 
I 
[ 10 CFR 20.1201' 
NOTES: " Results for public exposures are calculated at the site boundary. 
0.04 rem 
5 renl/yrh 
5 0  r c d y r  organ or tissue dose 
(other than the lens of the eye) 
50 r e d y r  skin dose 
h Total effective dose equivalent. 
' I0 CFR 63.1 1 I(a)( l ). which is referenced in I0 CFR 963.2. would require repository 
operations area to meet the requirements of I0 CFR part 30. 
10 CFR 20.1301(a)( I ) .  which is cross-referenced through I0 CFR 963.2; dose limit to 
extent applicable. 
I0 CFR 63.1 I I(b)( I ) .  which referenced in I0 CFR 963.1. would require repository 
design ohjectivcs for Category I and normal operations to meet 10 CFR 63.1 1 ] ( a ) ( ] )  
requirements ( 10 CFR part 20). 
0.01 r e d y r b  
0.10 r e d y r  
0.13 r e d y r  
7.2. Results of Post-Closure Evaluations 
The most challenging aspect of evaluating Yucca Mountain is assessing the likely post-closure 
performance of a repository 10,000 years into the future. As previously explained, the 
Department's Guidelines contemplate that this will be done using a Total System Performance 
Assessment. That assessment involves using data compiled from scientific investigation into the 
natural processes that affect the site, the behavior of the waste, and the behavior of the 
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engineered barriers such as the waste packages: developing models from these data; then 
developing a single model of how, as a whole. a repository at Yucca Mountain is likely to 
behave during the post-closure period. The model is then used to project radiation doses to 
which people in the vicinity of the Mountain are likely to be exposed as a result of the repository. 
Finally, the assessment compares the projected doses with the radiation protection standards lo 
determine whether the repository is likely to comply with them. 
The challenge, obviously, is that this involves making a prediction a very long time into the 
future concerning the behavior of a very complex system. To place 10,000 years into 
perspective, consider that the Roman Empire flourished nearly 2,000 years ago. The pyramids 
were built as long as 5,000 years ago, and plants were domesticated some 10,000 years ago. 
Accordingly, as the NRC explained, "Proof that the geologic repository will conform with the 
objectives for post-closure performance is not to be had in the ordinary sense of the word 
because of the uncertainties inherent in the understanding of the evolution of the geologic 
setting, biosphere, and engineered barrier system"'" over 10.000 years. The judgment that the 
NRC envisions making is therefore not a certainty that the repository will conform to the 
standard, certainty being unattainable in this or virtually any other important matter where 
choices must be made. Rather, as i t  goes on to explain, "For such long-term performance, what 
is required is reasonable expectation, making allowance for the time period, hazards, and 
uncertainties involved, that the outcome will conform with the objectives for post-closure 
performance for the geologic repository."'" The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board 
recently summarized much the same thought (emphasis added): "Eliminating all uncertainty 
associated with estimates of repository performance would never be possible at anv repository 
site.+" 
These views, in turn, inform my understanding of the judgment I am expected to make at this 
stage of the proceeding in evaluating the likely post-closure performance of a repository at 
Yucca Mountain. To conclude that i t  is suitable for post-closure, I do not need to know that we 
have answered all questions about the way each aspect of the repository will behave 10,000 years 
from now: that would be an impossible task. Rather, what I need to decide is whether, using the 
TSPA results, and fully bearing in mind the inevitable uncertainties connected with such an 
enterprise, I can responsibly conclude that we know enough to warrant a predictive judgment on 
my part that, during the post-closure period, a repository at Yucca Mountain is likely to meet the 
radiation protection standards. 
I believe I can. Essentially, the reason for this is the system of multiple and redundant 
safeguards that will be created by the combination of the site's natural barriers and the 
engineered ones we will add. Even given many uncertainties, this calculated redundancy makes 
it likely that very little, if any, radiation will find its way to the accessible environment. 
J? Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 
Final Rule. 66 Fed. Reg. 5573 1.55804, November 2,2001. 
J3 Ibid. 
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Before I describe in broad terms how the TSPA results and the criteria used in the regulations 
lead to this conclusion, I would like to give an illustration of how this works. The illustration @ draws on the TSPA analyses. but also explains what these analyses mean in the real world. 
An Example 
The most studied issue relating to Yucca Mountain. and the single most pressing concern many 
have felt about the post-closure phase of a repository there, is whether there might be a way for 
radionuclides from the emplaced nuclear materials to contaminate the water supply. This is not a 
problem unique to Yucca Mountain. Rather. besides disruptive events discussed later, water is 
the primary mechanism to transport radionuclides to people and is also the most likely 
mechanism for radionuclides to escape from the storage facilities we have now. 
In the case of Yucca Mountain, the concern has been that rainwater seeping into the Mountain 
might contact disposal casks and carry radionuclides down to the water table in sufficient 
amounts to endanger sources of groundwater. In my judgment, when one considers everything 
we have learned about the multiple natural and engineered barriers that lie at the core of the 
Department's planning for this Project, this concern turns out to have virtually no realistic 
foundation. 
Yucca Mountain is in the middle of a desert. Like any desert. it  has an arid climate, receiving 
less than eight inches of rain in an average year. Most of that runs off the Mountain or 
evaporates. Only about five percent, less than four-tenths of an inch per year, ever reaches 
a repository depth. 
In order to reach the tunnels where the waste casks would be housed, this water must travel 
through about 800 feet of densely welded and bedded tuffs,15 a trip that will typically require 
more than 1,000 years. The amount of water that eventually reaches the repository level at any 
point in time is very small, so small that capillary forces tend to retain it in small pores and 
fractures in the rock. It is noteworthy that all our observations so far indicate that no water 
actually drips into the tunnels at this level and of the water is retained within the rock. 
In spite of this finding. our TSPA ran calculations based on the assumption that water does drip 
into the tunnels. At that point, even just to reach radionuclides in the waste, the water would still 
have to breach the engineered barriers. These include waste packages composed of an outer 
barrier of highly corrosion-resistant alloy and a thick inner barrier of high quality stainless steel. 
45 Yucca Mountain conslsts of alternating layers of weldcd and nonwclded volcanic material known as welded and 
non-welded tuff: welded tuff at the surface, welded tuff at thc level of the repository, and an intervening layer of 
nonwelded tuffs. These nonwelded units contain few fractures: thus. they delay the downward flow of moisture into 
the welded tuff layer below. where the repository would be located. At the repository level, water in small fractures 
has a tendency to remain i n  the fractures rather than flow into larger openings, such as tunnels. Thus, the small 
amount of water uaveling through small fractures near any emplaccmcnt tunnel would tend to flow around the 
tunnel, rather than seepins. forming a drip, and falling onto the drlp shields below. Non-welded tuffs below the 
repository also provide a significant barrier to radionuclide transport. Deposits of minerals in the fractures 
demonstrate that for the last several million years the revositorv host rock has been under unsaturated conditions. 
even when higher precipitation. owing to the continent's overall glacial conditions, prevailed at the Mountain's 
surface. 
The waste package is designed to prevent contact between the waste pellets and water that might 
seep into the tunnels unexpectedly, and thus to prevent release of radion~clides!~ In addition, 
anchored above each waste package is a titanium drip shield that provides yet more protection 
against seepage. But even assuming the water defeats both the titanium shield and the metal 
waste package, the waste form itself is a barrier to the release of radionuclides. Specifically, the 
spent fuel is in the form of ceramic pellets. resistant to degradation and covered with a corrosion- 
resistant metal cladding. 
Nevertheless, DOE scientists ran a set of calculations assuming that water penetrated the 
titanium shield and made small holes in three waste packages, due to manufacturing defects 
(even though the manufacturing process will be tightly controlled). The scientists further 
assumed that the water dissolves some of the ceramic waste. Even so, the analyses showed that 
only smali quantities of radionuclides would diffuse and escape from the solid waste form. In 
order to reach the water table from the repository, the water, now assumed to be carrying 
radionuclides, must travel another 800 feet through layers of rock, some of which are nearly 
impenetrable. During this trip, many of the radionuclides are adsorbed by the rock because of its 
chemical properties. 
The result of all this is instructive. Even under these adverse conditions, all assumed in the teeth 
of a high probability that not one of them will come to pass. the amount of radionuclides 
reaching the water table is so low that annual doses to people who could drink the water are well 
below the applicable radiation standards, and less than a millionth of the annual dose people 
receive from natural background radiation. Extrapolating from these calculations shows that 
even if of the waste packages were breached in the fashion I have described above, the 
resulting contribution to annual dose would still be below the radiation safety standards, and less 
than one percent of the natural b a ~ k ~ r o u n d . ~ '  
Total Svstem Performance More Generallv 
It is important to understand that there is nothing unique about the kind of planning illustrated in 
the water seepage scenario described above. Rather, the scenario is characteristic of the studies 
DOE has undertaken and the solutions it has devised: deliberately pessimistic assumptions 
incorporated sometimes to the point of extravagance, met with multiple redundancies to assure 
safety. For example. one of our scenarios for Nevada postulates the return of ice ages, and 
examines Yucca Mountain assuming that it would receive about twice as much rain as it does 
today with four times as much infiltration into the Mountain. 
As in the example above, the Department evaluated physical and historical information used to 
develop models of repository components. and then employed those models to forecast how the 
repository would perform in the post-closure period. These results are described at length in the 
4h These engineered barriers will protect the waste under a wide range of conditions. For example, the barriers are 
protected by their underground location from the daily variations i n  temperature and moisture that occur above 
ground. As a result, the Mountain provides favorable conditions for the performance of these barriers. Indeed, the 
battery of tcsts we have conducted suggests that the waste packages are extremely resistant to corrosion. 
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TPSA analyses and summarized in Chapter 4 of the Yuccu Mountain Science and Engineering 
~ e ~ 0 r - t . ~ ~  
The Department used the suitability criteria set forth in 10 CFR 963.17 in the TSPA analyses. It 
carefully evaluated and modeled the behavior of characteristics of the site! such as its geologic, 
hydrologic, geophysical, and geochemical properties. Likewise it evaluated what are called 
unsaturated zone flow characteristics, such as precipitation entering the Mountain and water 
movement through the pores of the rock - in other words, natural processes which affect the 
amount of water entering the unsaturated zone above the repository and potentially coming in 
contact with wastes inside. DOE also evaluated and modeled near-field environment 
characteristics, such as effects of heat from the waste on waterflow through the site, the 
temperature and humidity at the engineered barriers, and chemical reactions and products that 
could result from water contacting the engineered barriers. 
The Department carefully studied and modeled the characteristics of the engineered barriers as 
they aged. DOE emphasized specifically those processes important to determining waste 
package lifetimes and the potential for corroding the package. It examined waste form 
degradation characteristics, including potential corrosion or break-down of the cladding on the 
spent fuel pellets and the ability of individual radionuclides to resist dissolving in water that 
might penetrate breached waste packages. I t  examined ways in which radionuclides could begin 
to move outward once the engineered barrier system has been degraded - for example, whether 
colloidal particles might form and whether radionuclides could adhere to these particles as they 
were assumed to wash through the remaining barriers. Finally, the Department evaluated and 
modeled saturated and unsaturated zone flow characteristics, such as how water with dissolved @ radionuclides or colloidal panicles might move through the unsaturated zone below the 
repository, how heat from the waste would affect waterflow through the site, and how water with 
dissolved radionuclides would move in the saturated zone 800 feet beneath the repository 
(assuming it could reach that depth). 
Consistent with I0 CFR 963.17, the Department also evaluated the lifestyle and habits of 
individuals who potentially could be exposed to radioactive material at a future time, based, as 
would be required by NRC licensing regu~ations,~' on representative current conditions. 
Currently, there are about 3,500 people who live in Amargosa Valley, the closest town to Yucca 
Mountain. They consume ground or surface water from the immediate area through direct 
extraction or by eating plants that have grown in the soil. The Department therefore assumed 
that the "reasonably maximally exposed individual" - that is, the hypothetical person envisioned 
to test whether the repository is likely to meet required radiation protection standards - likewise 
would drink water and eat agricultural products grown with water from the area, and built that 
assumption into its models. 
Using the models described above, as well as a host of others i t  generated taking account of other 
relevant features, events and processes that could affect the repository's performance, the 
Department developed a representative simulation of the behavior of the proposed Yucca 
Mountain site. It then considered thousands of possibilities about what might happen there. For 
48 Ibid. 
10 CFR part 63 
example, i t  considered the possibility tnat waste packages might be manufactured defectively. It 
considered the possibility that the climate ivould change. It considered earthquakes. Our studies 
show that earthquakes probably will occur at Yucca Mountain sometime in the future. Because 
the occurrence of earthquakes is difficult to predict, our models conservatively treat earthquakes 
by assuming that they will occur over the next 10.000 years. 
Essentially, if the Department believed that there was close to a 1 in 10,000 per year probability 
of some potentially adverse occurrence in the course of the 10,000 year post-closure period 
(which comes to a probability close to one during the entire period) the Department considered 
that possibility, unless i t  concluded the occurrence would not affect the repository's 
performance. It then used the simulation model to calculate what the resulting dose would be 
based on each such possibility. Finally, i t  used the mean peak values of the results of these 
calculations to project the resulting dose. 
The Department then proceeded to consider the impact of disruptive events, such as volcanism, 
with a lower probability of occurrence. on the order of one in 10,000 over the entire 10,000 year 
period (meaning roughly a one in a 100 million per year of occurring during that time). This led 
it to analyze, for example. the effects that a volcano might have on the repository's waste 
containment capabilities. Scientists started with a careful analysis of the entire geologic setting 
of Yucca Mountain. Then, with substantial data on regional volcanoes, they used computer 
modeling to understand each volcanic center's controlling structures. Experts then estimated the 
likelihood of magma intruding into one of the repository's emplacement tunnels. The DOE 
estimates the likelihood of such an event's occurring during the first 10,000 years after 
repository closure to be one chance in about 70 million per year, or one chance in 7,000 over the 
entire period. 
Including volcanoes in its analyses, the TSPA results still indicate that the site meets the EPA 
standard~.~"hat the calculations showed is that the projected, probability-weighted maximum 
mean annual dose to an individual from the repository for the next 10,000 years is one-tenth of a 
millirem. That is less than one-fifth of the dose an individual gets from a one-hour airplane 
flight. And it  is less than one one-hundredth of the dose that DOE's Guidelines, using the EPA 
standards, specify as acceptable for assessing suitability. 
Finally, in a separate assessment, analysts studied a hypothetical scenario under which people 
inadvertently intruded into the repository while drilling for water. The Guidelines' radiation 
protection standards, based on EPA and NRC rules. specify that as part of its Total System 
Performance Assessment, DOE should determine when a human-caused penetration of a waste 
package could first occur via drilling, assuming the drillers were using current technology and 
practices and did not recognize that they had hit anything unusual. If such an intrusion could 
occur within 10,000 years. the 15 millirem dose limit would apply. 
DOE's analyses. however, indicate that unrecognized contact through drilling would not happen 
within 10,000 years. Under conditions that DOE believes can realistically be expected to exist at 
50 The results produced under volcanic scenarios are weighted by probability under the NRC method specified for 
how to treat low probahiliry events. 10 CFR Part 63. 
the repository, the waste packages are extremely corrosion-resistant for tens of thousands of 
years. Even ur~der pessimistic assumptions. the earliest time DOE could even.devise a scenario 
under which a waste package would be unfioticeable to a driller is approximately 30,000 years. 
Before then, the waste package structure would be readily apparent to a driller who hit it. 
Table 2 presents the summary results of the Total System Performance Assessment analyses and 
how they compare to the radiation protection standards." 
In Summary 
Using the methods and criteria set out in DOE'S Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines, I 
am convinced that the Yucca Mountain site is scientifically suitable - in a word, safe - for 
development of a repository. Specifically, on the basis of the safety evaluation DOE has 
conducted pursuant to 10 CFR 963.13, it is my judgment that a repository at the site is likely to 
meet applicable radiation protection standards for the pre-closure period. And on the basis of the 
Total System Performance Assessment DOE has conducted pursuant to 10 CFR 963.16, it is my 
judgment that a repository at the site is likely to meet applicable radiation protection standards 
for the post-closure period as well. Additionally, I have evaluated the pre-closure suitability 
criteria of 10 CFR 963.14 and the post-closure suitability criteria of 10 CFR 963.17, and am 
convinced that the safety evaluations were done under the stringent standards required. 
Accordingly. I find the Yucca Mountain site suitable for development of a repository. 
8. The National Interest 
Having determined that the site is scientifically suitable. I now turn to the remaining factors I 
outlined above as bearing on my Recommendation. Are there compelling national interests 
favoring going forward with a repository at Yucca Mountain? If so, are there countervailing 
considerations of sufficient weight to overcome those interests? In this section I set out my 
conclusions on the first question. In section 9 I set out my views on the second. 
8.1. Nuclear Science and the National Interest 
Our country depends in many ways on the benefit5 of nuclear science: in the generation of 
twenty percent of the Nation's electricity; in the operation of many of the Navy's most strategic 
vessels; in the maintenance of the Nation's nuclear weapons arsenal; and in numerous research 
and development projects, both medical and scientific. All these activities produce radioactive 
wastes that have been accumulating since the mid- 1940s. They are currently scattered among 
13 1 sites in 39 states, residing in temporary surface storage facilities and awaiting final disposal. 
In exchange for the many benefits of nuclear power, we assume the cost of managing its 
byproducts in a responsible, safe, and secure fashion. And there is a near-universal consensus 
that a deep geologic facility is the only scientifically credible. long-term solution to a problem 
that will only grow more difficult the longer i t  is ignored. 
5 ,  Yucca Mo~rrltc~itl Sitr S~titcrhilip. Evaluation. 
Table 2. Summary Post-Closure Dose and Activity Concentration Limits and 
Evaluation Results I d a d  L i d  Results' 
Individual protection standard: 
10  CFR 63.3 1 1 ,  referenced in 15 m r e d y r  TEDE 0.1 m r e d y r  (HTOM) 
10  CFR 963.2 0. l mrem/yra (LTOM) 
10 CFR 963.2 
1 5 pCi/L combined radium-326 I 
Human intrusion standard: 
10 CFR 63.32 1, referenced in 
Groundwater protection standard: 
10 CFR 63.33 1 .  referenced in 
10 CFR 963.2 
15 m r e d y r  TEDE N A ~  
and radium-228, including 
natural background 
1 radionuclides I 
NOTES: a Probabil~ty-weighted peak mean dose equivalent for the norri~nal and d~hrupt~vc s enarios. which include igneous 
I .(W pCi/Lc (HTOM) 
1.03 pCi/Lc (LTOM) 
15 pCi/L gross alpha activity 
(including radium-226 but 
excluding radon and uranium). 
including natural background 
4 m r e d y r  to the whole body 
or any organ from combined 
beta-and photon-emitt~ng 
acti\'ity: results are h a d  on an averagc annual water demand of approxiriiatel 1.MX) acrr-ft: the m a n  dose for groundwater- 
pathway-dominated scenarios would be reduced by appro.iirnately one-th~rd h! u\lng 3.000 acre-ft. 
I . I p~i /L ' .d  (HTOM) 
1 . 1  p~ i /Lc .d  (LTOM) 
.000023 m r e d y r  (HTOM) 
.OOOO 1 3 m r e d y r  (LTOM) 
b 
Human-intrusion-related releases are not expected dunng the period of regulatory compliance; the DOE has 
determined that the exliest t ~ m e  after disposal that the waste package would degrade sufficiently that a human 
intrusion could occur without recognition by the driller IS at least 3O.OW years. so the dose limits do not apply for 
purposes of the site su~tabil~ty evaluation. 
These values represent measured natural background radiation concentrations, calculated activity concentrations 
from repository releases rut. well below minimum detectron levels. backgrvund radiation concentrations, and 
regulatory lim~ts. 
Gross alpha background concentrations are 0 4 pCi/L 2 0 7 (for maxiniurrl ol. I I pCi/L) 
Peak value of the mean prohahilily-weighted results w~thin the regulati)n t~riiel.rar~ie 
TEDE= total effect~ve dose equivalent. HTOM= h~gher emprrature operating iii(xle. LTOM= lower-temperature operating mode: 
NA= not applicable. Source: Willlams ZOOIa. Section 6. Tables 6-1. 6-2.6-3. and 6-4 
8.2. Energy Security 
Roughly 20 percent of our country's electricity is generated from nuclear power. This means 
that, on average, each home. farm, factory, and business in America runs on nuclear fuel for a 
little less than five hours a day. 
A balanced energy policy - one that makes use of multiple sources of energy, rather than 
becoming dependent entirely on generating electricity from a single source, such as natural gas - 
is important to economic growth. Our vulnerability to shortages and price spikes rises in direct 
proportion to our failure to maintain diverse sources of power. To assure that we will continue to 
have reliable and affordable sources of energy, we need to preserve our access to nuclear power. 
Yet the Federal government's failure to meet its obligation to dispose of spent nuclear fuel under 
the NWPA - as i t  has been supposed to do starting in 1998 - is placing our access to this source 
of energy in jeopardy. Nuclear power plants have been storing their spent fuel on site, but many 
are running out of space to do so. Unless a better solution is found, a growing number of these 
plants will not be able to find additional storage space and will be forced to shut down 
prematurely. Nor are we likely to see any new plants built. 
Already we are facing a growing imbalance between our projected energy needs and our 
projected supplies. The loss of existing electric generating capacity that we will experience if 
nuclear plants start going off-line would significantly exacerbate this problem, leading to price 
spikes and increased electricity rates as relatively cheap power is taken off the market. A 
permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel is essential to our continuing to count on nuclear 
energy to help us meet our energy demands. 
8.3. National Security 
8.3.1. Powering rlle Nuvy Nuclear Fleet 
A strong Navy is a vital part of national security. Many of the most strategically important 
vessels in our fleet, including submarines and aircraft carriers, are nuclear powered. They have 
played a major role in every significant military action in which the United States has been 
involved for some 40 years, including our current operations in Afghanistan. They are also 
essential to our nuclear deterrent. In  short, our nuclear-powered Navy is indispensable to our 
status as a world power. 
For the nuclear Navy to function, nuclear ships must be refueled periodically and the spent fuel 
removed. The spent fuel must go someplace. Currently, as part of a consent decree entered into 
between the State of Idaho and the Federal Government, this material goes to temporary surface 
storage facilities at the Idaho National Environmental and Engineering Laboratory. But this 
cannot continue indefinitely, and indeed the agreement specifies that the spent fuel must be 
removed. Failure to establish a permanent disposition pathway is not only irresponsible, but 
could also create serious future uncertainties potentially affecting the continued capability of our 
Naval operations. 
8.3.2. Allowing tlle Nutiort to Deconlnlissiorz I t s  S~rrpl~rs Nlrclear Weupons und Support 
Nuclear Non-Proliferution Eflorrs 
A decision now on the Yucca Mountain repository is also important in several ways to our 
efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. First. the end of the Cold War has 
brought the welcome challenge to our country of disposing of surplus weapons-grade plutonium 
as part of the process of decommissioning weapons we no longer need. Current plans call for 
turning the plutonium into "mixed-oxide" or "MOX" fuel. But creating MOX fuel as well as 
burning the fuel in a nuclear reactor will generate spent nuclear fuel, and other byproducts which 
themselves will require somewhere to go. A geological repository is critical to completing 
disposal of these materials. Such complete disposal is important if we are to expect other nations 
to decommission their own weapons, which they are unlikely to do unless persuaded that we are 
truly decommissioning our own. 
A repository is important to non-proliferation for other reasons as well. Unauthorized removal 
8 of nuclear materials from a repository will be difficult even in the absence of strong institutional controls. Therefore, in countries that lack such controls, and even in our own, a safe repository 
is essential in preventing these materials from falling into the hands of rogue.nations. By 
permanently disposing of nuclear weapons materials in a facility of this kind, the United States 
would encourage other nations to do the same. 
8.4. Protecting the Environment 
An underground repository at Yucca Mountain is important to our efforts to protect our 
environment and achieve sustainable growth in two ways. First, it will allow us to dispose of the 
radioactive waste that has been building up in our country for over fifty years in a safe and 
environmentally sound manner. Second, i t  will facilitate continued use and potential expansion 
of nuclear power, one of the few sources of electricity currently available to us that emits no 
carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases. 
As to the first point: While the Federal government has long promised that it would assume 
responsibility for nuclear waste, i t  has yet to start implementing an environmentally sound 
approach for disposing of this material. It is past time for us to do so. The production of 
nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War and for many years thereafter has resulted 
in a legacy of high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel, currently located in Tennessee, 
Colorado, South Carolina, New Mexico, New York, Washington, and Idaho. Among these 
wastes, approximately 100,000,000 gallons of high-level liquid waste are stored in, and in some 
instances have leaked from. temporary holding tanks. In addition to this high-level radioactive 
waste, about 2,100 metric tons of solid, unreprocessed fuel from a plutonium-production reactor 
are stored at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, with another 400 metric tons stored at other DOE 
sites. 
In addition, under the NWPA, the Federal government is also responsible for disposing of spent 
commercial fuel, a program that was to have begun in 1998, four years ago. More than 161 
million Americans, well more than half the population, reside within 75 miles of a major nuclear 
facility - and, thus, within 75 miles of that facility's aging and temporary capacity for storing 
this material. Moreover, because nuclear reactors require abundant water for cooling, on-site 
storage tends to be located near rivers, lakes, and seacoasts. Ten closed facilities, such as Big 
Rock Point. on the banks of Lake Michigan, also house spent fuel and incur significant annual 
costs without providing any ongoing benefit. Over the long-term, without active management 
and monitoring. degrading surface storage facilities may pose a risk to any of 20 major U.S. 
lakes and waterways, including the Mississippi River. Millions of Americans are served by 
municipal water systems with intakes along these waterways. In recent letters, Governors Bob 
Taft of 0hio" and John Engler of ~ ich igan"  raised concerns about the advisability of long-term 
storage of spent fuel in temporary systems so close to major bodies of water. The scientific 
consensus is that disposal of this material in a deep underground repository is not merely the safe 
answer and the right answer for protecting our environment but the o& answer that has any 
degree of realism. 
'' Letter. Governor Bob Taf't to Secretary Spencer Abraham. July 30. 2001. 
53 Letter. Governor John Enpler to Secretary Spencer Abraham. September 5. 2001. 
In addition, nuclear power is one of only a few sources of power available tc us now in a 
potentially plentiful and economical manner that could drastically reduce air pollution and 
greenhouse gas emissions caused by the generation of electricity. It produces no controlled air 
pollutants, such as sulfur and particulates, or greenhouse gases. Therefore, it can help keep our 
air clean, avoid generation of ground-level ozone, and prevent acid rain. A repository at Yucca 
Mountain is indispensable to the maintenance and potentia! expansion of the use of this 
environmentally efficient source of energy. 
8.5. Facilitating Continuation of Research, Medical, and Humanitarian Programs 
The Department has provided fuel for use in research reactors in domestic and foreign 
universities and laboratories. Research reactors provide a wide range of benefits including the 
production of radioisotopes for medical use - e .g . ,  in body-scan imaging and the treatment of 
cancer. To limit the risk to the public, and to support nuclear non-proliferation objectives, these 
laboratories are required to return the DOE-origin spent fuel from domestic research reactors and 
from foreign research reactors. These spent fuels are temporarily stored at Savannah River, 
South Carolina, and at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory while 
awaiting disposal in a permanent repository. 
Again, we can either implement a permanent solution - Yucca Mountain - or risk eroding our 
capacity to conduct this kind of research. The chances of a person becoming sick from the 
nuclear materials to be stored at the Yucca Mountain site are, as shown above, all but non- 
0 existent. Responsible critics must balance that against the chance of a person becoming sick as a result of the research that may not be undertaken. remaining sick for want of the drug that may 
not be found, or dying for lack of the cure that may not be developed - all because the nuclear 
fuel-dependent science that could produce these things was never done, our country having run 
out of places to dispose of the waste. 
8.6. Assisting Anti-Terrorism at Home 
As I have noted previously, spent fuel and other high level radioactive waste is presently stored 
at temporary storage facilities at 13 1 locations in 39 states. Ten of these are at shutdown reactor 
sites for which security would not otherwise be required. Moreover, many reactors are 
approaching their storage capacity and are likely to seek some form of off-site storage, thereby 
creating potential new targets. 
Storage by reactor-owners was intended to be a temporary arrangement. The design of the 
storage facilities reflects that fact. They tend to be less secured than the reactors themselves, and 
the structures surrounding the fuel stored in aboveground containers are also less robust. 
These storage facilities should be able to withstand current threats. But as the determination and 
sophistication of terrorists increases, that may well change. That means we will have to choose 
one of two courses. We can continue to endeavor to secure each of these sites, many of which, 
as noted above, are close to major metropolitan areas and waterways. Or we can consolidate this 
fuel in one remote. secure. arid underground location and continue to develop state-of-the-art 
security arrangements to protect it there. 
To me the choice is clear. The proposed geologic repository in the desert at Yucca Mountain 
offers unique features that make it far easier to secure against terrorist threats. These include: 1) 
disposal 800 feet beiow ground; 2)  remote location: 3) restricted access afforded by Federal land 
ownership of the Nevada Test Site; 4) proximity to Nellis Air Force Range; 5) restricted airspace 
above the site; 6) far from any major waterways. The design and operation of a geologic 
repository, including surface operations, can also incorporate from the beginning appropriate 
features to protect against a terrorist threat and can be changed, if necessary, to respond to future 
changes in the terrorist threat. 
An operational repository will also be an important signal to other nuclear countries, none of 
which have opened a repository. Inadequately protected nuclear waste in any country is a 
potential danger to us, and we can't expect them to site a facility if we, with more resources, 
won't. A fresh look at nuclear material security should involve new concepts such as those 
inherent in a geologic repository, and should set the standard for the manner in which the 
international community manages its own nuclear materials. 
To understand Yucca Mountain's relative advantage in frustrating potential terrorist attacks 
compared to the storlrs qro.  one need only ask the following: If nuclear materials were already 
emplaced there, would anyone even suggest that we should spread them to 13 1 sites in 39 states, 
at locations typically closer to major cities and waterways than Yucca Mountain is, as a means of 
a discouraging a terrorist attack? 
8.7. Summary 
In short, there are important reasons to move forward with a repository at Yucca Mountain. 
Doing so will advance our energy security by helping us to maintain diverse sources of energy 
supply. It will advance our national security by helping to provide operational certainty to our 
nuclear Navy and by facilitating the decomissioning of nuclear weapons and the secure 
disposition of nuclear materials. I t  will help us clean up our environment by allowing us to close 
the nuclear fuel cycle and giving us greater access to a form of energy that does not emit 
greenhouse gases. And i t  will help us in our efforts to secure ourselves against terrorist threats 
by allowing us to remove nuclear materials from scattered above-ground locations to a single, 
secure underground facility. Given the site's scientific and technical suitability, I find that 
compelling national interests counsel in favor of taking the next step toward siting a repository at 
Yucca Mountain. 
9. None of the Argurnertts Against Yucca Mountain Withstands Analysis 
As explained above. after months of study based on research unique in its scope and depth, I 
have concluded that the Yucca Mountain site is fully suitable under the most cautious standards 
that reasonably might be applied. I have also concluded that i t  serves the national interest in 
numerous important ways. The final question I shall examine is whether the arguments against 
its designation not rise to a level that outweighs the case for going forward. I believe they do 
not, as I shall explain. I do so by briefly describing these principle arguments made by 
e opponents of the Project, and then responding to them. 
9.1. Assertion 1: The Citizens of Nevada Were Denied an Adequate Opportunity to 
Be Heard 
Critics have claimed that the decision-making process under the NWPA was unfair because it 
allowed insufficient opportunity for public input. particularly from the citizens of Nevada. That 
is not so. There was ample opportunity for public discussion and debate; the Department in fact 
went well beyond the Act's requirements in providing notice and the opportunity to be heard. 
My predecessors and I invited and encouraged public, governmental, and tribal participation at 
all levels. The Department also made numerous Yucca Mountain documents available to the 
public. These included several specifically prepared to inform any who might be interested of 
the technical information and analyses that I would have before me as I considered the suitability 
of the site. There was no statutory requirement for producing these documen-ts; I considered it 
important to make them available, and thus to provide a timely sharing of information that would 
form the basis of my consideration and, ultimately, decision. 
To assist in discharging part of the Secretarial responsibilities created by the Act, the Department 
conducted official public meetings before starting the Environmental Impact Statement. 
Subsequently, the Department held a total of 23 public hearings on the draft and the 
supplemental draft Environmental Impact Statements. With the release of the Yucca Mountain 
Science and Engineering Report in May 2001, the DOE opened a public comment period lasting 
approximately six months; the penod continued through the release of the Preliminary Site 
Suitability Evaluation in July 200 1 and closed on October 19, 200 1. After publishing DOE'S 
final rule, "Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines," on November 14, 2001, I announced an 
additional 30-day supplemental comment period with a closing date of December 14,2001. 
During these combined public comment periods. the DOE held 66 additional public hearings 
across Nevada and in Inyo County, California. to receive comments on my consideration of a 
possible recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site. More than 17,000 comments were 
received." 
The lengths to which the Department went to solicit public comment can be seen in the details: 
from 1995 through 2001, there were 126 official hearings with a court reporter present. The 
Nevada cities where these hearings were held included: Amargosa Valley, Battle Mountain, 
Caliente. Carson City, Crescent Valley, Elko, Ely. Fallon. Gardnerville, Goldfield, Hawthorne, 
Las Vegas, Lovelock, Pahrump, Reno, Tonopah. Virginia City, Winnemucca, and Yerington. 
Elsewhere, meetings were held in Independence. Lone Pine. Sacramento, and San Bernardino in 
California; Washington. DC; Boise, ID; Chicago, IL; Denver, CO; DallasFt. Worth, TX; Salt 
Lake City, UT; Baltimore, MD; Albany, NY; Atlanta, GA: Kansas City, MO.; Cleveland, OH; 
and St. Louis, MO. 
There were 600 hours of public meetings for the 2001 hearings alone. All in all, there were a 
total of 528 comment days, or about a year and a half. Additionally, the science centers were 
Conlnrerrr S l t n l n ~ n n  L)oclrn~etlr and Supplen~enral Commetrr Slrnltrl~~n. l ) o c ~ t n r c ~ t ~ ~ .  February 2002. 
open for 340 hours (both with and without court reporter) to receive comments. Since 1991, 
there have been 2,062 tours of Yucca Mountain. and 49,073 visitors have been to the site. 
In light of the extensive opportunities DOE has provided for public input, it is my judgment that 
the opportunities for hearing and consideration of comments were abundant and met any 
procedural measure of fairness. 
9.2. Assertion 2: The Project Has Received Inadequate Study 
Critics have said that there has been inadequate study to determine Yucca Mountain's suitability. 
To the contrary, and as I believe section 6 of this Recommendation makes clear at length, the 
characterization process at Yucca Mountain is unprecedented for any even remotely comparable 
undertaking. Indeed, Yucca Mountain studies have now been under way for nearly five times as 
long as it took to build the Hoover Dam and more than six times the entire duration of the 
Manhattan Project. Yucca Mountain is, by any measure, the most exhaustively studied project of 
its kind the world has ever known. 
Beginning in 1978 and continuing to the present day, the Department has spent billions of dollars 
on characterization studies. There has been ongoing dialogue between the Department and the 
NRC over the goals, content and results of the test programs. As noted, there have been ample 
opportunities for public involvement. At this still early stage. and with many more years before 
the Yucca Mountain site could become operational. the request for yet more preliminary study, 
even before seeking a license from the NRC, is unsupportable. Additional study will be 
undertaken at stages to come as an appropriate part of the licensing process. 
For these reasons, I have concluded that the current body of accumulated scientific and technical 
knowledge provides a more than adequate technical basis to designate the Yucca Mountain site, 
thereby beginning the licensing phase of the project. For convenience, a listing of the types of 
tests that have been performed is provided in Table 3. 
9.3. Assertion 3: The Rules Were Changed in the Middle of the Game 
The State of Nevada claims that at some point the Department concluded that Yucca Mountain 
was not suitable under earlier regulations, and then changed the rules to fit the site. That is not 
true. Even the most elementary knowledge of the history of the program shows this claim is 
baseless. 
The Guidelines did change, but not in a way that disadvantaged critics from making their case, 
and certainly not to suit any pre-existing agenda at the Department. Rather, they were changed 
to conform to changes in the statutory and regulatory framework governing the siting process 
and in the scientific consensus regarding the best approach for assessing the likely performance 
of a repository over long periods of time. 
Table 3: Types of Tests Performed to Collect Data for Site Characterization of 
Yucca Mountain 55 
55 Summary information ahout progress in testing is provided to the NRC twice each year. There are 23 Semiannual 
Progress Reports availahlc. covering all testing for the Yucca Mountain sitc. These documents include references 
to numerous technical reports of the Program. which numhcr In the thousands. 
Process Models 
Unsaturated Zone 
(the rocks above the water table containing little water that 
limit the amount of water that can contact waste packages) 
Near-Field Environment 
(moisture, temperature. and chemistry conditions 
surrounding and affecting the waste packages) 
Engineered Barrier System (EBS) 
(man-made features comprising the repository that 
influence how radionuclides might move) 
Waste Package 
(metal container that the wastes would be placed in) 
Waste Form 
(high-level wastes and spent fuel that are the source of 
radionuclides) 
Saturated Zone 
(movement of water in  rocks hclow the water table) 
Types of Tests and Studies 
Future climate studies 
Intiltration model studies 
Unsaturated zone flow model studies 
Seepage model studies 
Unsaturated zone transport studies 
Drift scale test 
Single heater test 
Large block test 
Field tests on coupled processes 
Lahoratory coupled processes tests 
Cementicious materials tests 
EBS design tests 
In-drift pas composition tests 
In-drift water chemistry, precipitates and salts tests 
Microbial communities tests 
Radionuclide transport tests 
Drift degradation analysis tests 
Rock mass mechanical properties tests 
Waste package environment tests 
Materials selection studies 
General corrosion tests 
Localized corrosion tests 
Stress corrosion cracking tests 
Hydrogen-induced cracking tests 
Metallurgical stabilitytphases tests 
Manufacturing defects tests 
Filler material tests 
Welding tcsts 
Radioisotope inventory study 
In-package chemistry tests 
Commercial spent nuclear fuel cladding degradation tests 
Defense spent nuclear fuel degradation tests 
High level waste @lass degradation tests 
D~ssolvcd radioisotope concentration tests 
Colloid radioisotope concentration tests 
Saturated zone characterization studies 
Saturated zone flow studies 
Saturated zone transport studies 
Table 3: Types of Tests Performed to Collect Data for Site Characterization of 
Yucca Mountain, continued 
The DOE's original siting Guidelines were promulgated in 1984. At the time, the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act called on the Department to evaluate and characterize multiple sites and to 
recommend one or more among them. Also at the time, consistent with the scientific and 
regulatory consensus of the late 19701s, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had in place 
regulations for licensing repositories that sought to protect against radioactive releases by 
focusing on the performance of individual subparts, or subsystems, that were part of the 
repository. Finally, the EPA had proposed rules for repositories that also focused on limiting the 
amount and type of radionuclides released from a repository. Consistent with this framework, 
DOE's Guidelines focused on making comparative judgments among sites and emphasized 
mechanisms for evaluating the performance of potential repository subsystems against the NRC 
subsystem performance requirements and the EPA release limits. 
Integrated Site Model 
(computer models of the geology) 
Site Description 
(description of the repository) 
Disruptive Events 
(unlikely disruptions to the repository) 
Starting in 1987, however, both the regulatory framework and scientific consensus began to 
change. To begin with, Congress changed the law governing evaluation and selection of a 
repository site. In 1987, i t  amended the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to eliminate any authority or 
responsibility on the part of the Department for comparing sites, directed the Department to 
cease all evaluation of any potential repository sites other than Yucca Mountain, and directed it 
to focus its efforts exclusively on determining whether or not to recommend the Yucca Mountain 
site. This change was important, as i t  eliminated a central purpose of the Guidelines - to 
compare and contrast multiple fully characterized sites for ultimate selection of one among 
several for recommendation. 
Geologic framework model studies 
Rock properties model studies 
Mineralogical model studies 
Gcologic mapping studies 
Fracture data collection studies 
Natural resources assessment studies 
Erosion studies 
Natural and man-made analog studies 
Probability of igneous activity studies 
Characteristics of igneous activity studies 
Seismic hazards studies 
Next, Congress reinforced its directive to focus on Yucca Mountain in section 801 of the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992. This provision also gave three new directives to EPA. First, it directed 
EPA, within 90 days of enactment, to contract with the National Academy of Sciences for a 
study regarding. among other topics, whether a specific kind of radiation protection standard for 
repositories would be protective of public health and safety. The question posed was whether 
standards prescribing a maximum annual effective dose individuals could receive from the 
repository - as opposed to the then-current standards EPA had in place focusing on releases - 
would be reasonable standards for protecting health and safety at the Yucca Mountain site. 
Second, Congress directed EPA, consistent with the findings and recommendations of the 
Academy, to promulgate such standards no later than one year after completion of the 
Academy's study. Finally, it directed that such standards, when promulgated, would be the 
exclusive public health and safety standards applicable to the Yucca Mountain site. Section 801 
also contained a directive to the NRC that, within a year after EPA's promulgation of the new 
standards, NRC modify its licensing criteria for repositories under the NWPA as necessary to bc 
consistent with the EPA sta~dards. 
Pursuant to the section 80 1 directive, in 1995 the National Academy of Sciences published a 
report entitled "Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain ~tandards."~' This report concluded that 
dose standards would be protective of public health and safety." It also concluded that if EPA 
adopted this kind of standard, i t  would be appropriate for the NRC to revise its licensing rules, 
which currently focused on subsystem performance, to focus instead on the performance of the 
total repository system, including both its engineered and natural barriers. It noted that this 
would be a preferable approach because it was the performance of the entire repository, not the 
different subsystems, that was crucial, and that imposition of separate subsystem performance 
requirements might result in suboptimal performance of the repository as a whole.'8 Finally, 
National Academy of Sciences noted that its recommendations, if adopted, "impl[ied] the 
developmerlt of regu1c1tor-y artd anctlyrical crpproaches for Yucca Mountain that are different from 
those employed in the past" whose promulgation would likely require more than the one-year 
timeframe specified in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. 
Along with these changes in regulatory thinking, the scientific and technical understanding of @ repository performance at Yucca Mountain was advancing. The DOE's use of Total System 
Performance Assessment to evaluate repository performance became more sophisticated, and 
helped focus DOE's research work on those areas important to maximizing the safety of the 
repository and minimizing public exposure to radionuclide releases from the repository. 
In 1999, the culmination of years of scientific and technical advancements and careful regulatory 
review resulted in EPA and NRC proposals for new regulations specific to a repository at Yucca 
Mountain based on state-of-the-art science and regulatory standards." Since section 1 13(c) of 
the NWPA directed DOE to focus its site characterization activities on those necessary to 
evaluate the suitability of the site for a license application to the NRC, the proposed changes to 
the EPA and NRC rules in turn required DOE to propose modifications to its criteria and 
methodology for determining the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site. Accordingly, DOE 
proposed new state-of-the-art Yucca-Mountain-specific site suitability Guidelines consistent with 
NRC licensing regulations.b0 After EPA and NRC finalized their revisions," DOE promptly 




59 Disposal of High-Lcvel Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geological Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 
Proposed Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 8640, February 22, 1999; Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada, Proposed Rule. 64 Fed. Reg. 46975, August 27. 1999. 
60 General Guidelines for the Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear Waste Repositories, Yucca Mountain Site 
Suitability Guidelines. 63 Fed. Reg. 67054, November 30. 1999. 
finalized its own.6' For the reasons explained in the National Academy of Sciences study, the 
revised Guidelines'. focus on the performance of the total repository system also makes them a @ bettcr tool for protection of public safety than the old Guidelines, since the old subsystem 
approach might have resulted in a repository whose subsystems performed better in one or 
another respect but whose total performance in protecting human health was inferior. 
In short, far from seeking to manipulate its siting Guidelines to fit the site, DOE had no choice 
but to amend its Guidelines to confonn with the new regulatory framework established at 
Congress's direction by the National Academy of Sciences, the EPA, and the NRC. Moreover, 
this framework represents the culmination of a carefully considered set of regulatory decisions 
initiated at the direction of the Congress of the United States and completed nine years later, in 
which top scientists in the country have participated, and in which expert regulatory authorities, 
the NRC and the EPA. have played the leading role. These authorities likewise agree that the 
new regulatory framework, of which the Department's revised Guidelines are a necessary part, 
forms a coherent whole well designed to protect the health and safety of'the public. 
9.4. Assertion 4: The Process Tramples States' Rights 
Some have argued that a Federal selection of siting disrespects states' rights. That is incorrect. 
Indeed, Nevada's interests have been accorded a place in Federal law to an extent seldom, if 
ever, seen before. 
As provided by the NWPA. the State of Nevada has the right to veto any Presidential site 
recommendation. It may do so by submitting a notice of disapproval to Congress within 60 days @ of the President's action. 
If Nevada submits a notice of disapproval, Congress has 90 calendar days of continuous session 
to override the notice by passing a resolution of siting designation. If it does not do so, the 
State's disapproval becomes effective. 
The respect due Nevada has not stopped with grudging obedience to the statutory commands. 
Instead, as noted previously, the Department has held hearings over a range of dates and places 
well in excess of what reasonably could have been viewed as a statutory mandate. And I have 
taken full account of Governor Guinn's comment and those of Nevada's other elected officials 
who oppose this Project. Although they reflect a view I do not share, I will continue to accord 
them the highest degree of respect. 
Finally, the Federal Government has appropriated more funds to Nevada to conduct its own 
Yucca Mountain studies than any other State has ever been given for any remotely similar 
purpose. Since the start of the Program in 1983, the State of Nevada has received over $78 
million in oversight funding. Since 1989, when the affected units of local government requested 
61~ub l i c  Health and Env~ronmcntal Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Final Rule, 66 FR 
32073, June 13. 2001; Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in  a Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada: Final Rule. 66 FR 55732, November 2, 2001. 
a 62 General Guidelines for the Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear Waste Repositories, Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines. Final Rule. 66,Fed. Reg. 57303. November 14. 2001. 
oversight funding, they have received over $67 million. In total, the State of Nevada and the 
affected units of local government have received over $145 million over that timeframe; with 
Nye County, home to Yucca Mountain, receiving over $22 million and Clark County, home to 
Las Vegas, receiving about $25 million. In addition, over the last 10 years, the State of Nevada 
and the affected units of local government have been giver] over $73 rnilliorl to compensate for 
taxes they would have collected on the site cnaracterization and the development and operation 
of a repository if they were legally authorized to tax activities of the Federal Government. Nye 
County has also conducted its own oversight drilling program since 1996, for which over that 
time Nye has received almost $21 million. Thus, the grand total that has been awarded to the 
state and its local governments simply on account of Yucca Mountain research has been nearly 
$240 million. 
Given the extensive evidence that the state has been, and will be, accorded a degree of 
involvement and authority seldom if ever accorded under similar circumstances, it is my 
judgment that the assertion of an infringement on state's rights is incorrect. 
9.5. Assertion 5: Transportation of Nuclear Materials is Disruptive and Dangerous 
Critics have argued that transporting wastes to Yucca Mountain is simply too dangerous, given 
the amount involved and the distances that will need to be traversed, sometimes near population 
centers. 
These concerns are not substantiated for three principal reasons. First, they take no account of 
the dangers of not transporting the wastes and leaving them to degrade andlor accumulate in their 
present, temporary facilities. Second, they pay no heed to the fact that, if the Yucca Mountain 
repository is not built, some wastes that would have been bound for that location will have to be 
transported elsewhere, meaning that our real choice is not between transporting or not 
transporting, but between transporting with as much planning and safety as possible, or 
transporting with such organization as the moment might invite. And third, they ignore the 
remarkable record of safe transportation of nuclear materials that our country has achieved over 
more than three decades. 
The first point is not difficult to understand. The potential hazards of transporting wastes are 
made to appear menacing only by ignoring the potential hazards of leaving the material where it 
is - at 13 1 aging surface facilities in 39 states. Every ton of waste not transported for five or ten 
minutes near a town on the route to Yucca Mountain is a ton of waste left sitting in or near 
someone else's town - and not for five or ten minutes but indefinitely. Most of the wastes left 
where they are in or near dozens of towns (and cities) continue to accumulate day-by-day in 
temporary facilities not intended for long-term storage or disposal. 
The second point is also fairly simple. Many of these older sites have reached or will soon reach 
pool storage limits. Over 40 are projected to need some form of dry storage by 2010. Additional 
facilities will therefore be required. There are real limits, however. to how many of these can 
realistically be expected to be built on site. Many utilities do not have the space available to 
build them, and are likely to face major regulatory hurdles in attempting to acquire it. 
Therefore one way or another, unless all these reactors shut down, off-site storage facilities will 
need to be built, substantial amounts of waste will have to be transported there, and this will 
happen not in the distant future but quite soon. For example, today nuclear utilities and a Native 
American tribe in Utah are working toward construction of an "interim" storage facility on tribal 
land. Whether or not this effort ultimately succeeds. i t  is likely that some similar effort will. 
Thus, if we are merely to keep our present supply of nuclear energy, at some fast-approaching 
point there will be transportation of nuclear wastes. The oniy question is whether we will have 
(a) numerous supplemental storage sites springing up, with transportation to them arranged ad 
hoc, or (b) one permanent repository, with transportation to it arranged systematically and with 
years of advance planning. The second alternative is plainly preferable, making the Yucca 
Mountain plan superior on this ground alone. 
Finally, transportation of nuclear waste is not remotely the risky venture Yucca's critics seek to 
make it out to be. Over the last 30 years, there have been over 2.700 shipments of spent nuclear 
fuel. Occasional traffic accidents have occurred, but there has not been one identifiable injury 
related to radiation exposure because of them. In addition, since 1975, or since the last stages of 
the war in Vietnam, national security shipments have traveled over 100 million miles - more 
than the distance from here to the sun - with no accidents causing a fatality or harmful release of 
radioactive material." 
Our safety record is com arable to that in Europe. where nuclear fuel has been transported 9 
extensively since 1966.' Over the last 35 years. more than 70,000 MTU (an amount roughly 
equal to what is expected to be shipped over the entire active life of the Yucca Mountain Project) 
has been shipped in approximately 20,000 casks. France and Britain average 650 shipments per 
year, even though the population density in each of those countries grossly exceeds that of the 
United States. 
Even so, we need not, and should not, be content to rest upon the record of the past no matter 
how good. For transportation to Yucca Mountain. the Department of Transportation has 
established a process that DOE and the states must use for evaluating potential routes. 
Consistent with Federal regulations, the NRC would approve all routes and security plans and 
would certify transportation casks prior to shipment. 
In short, for all these reasons. 1 have concluded that the stated concerns about transportation are 
ill-founded and should not stand in the way of taking the next step toward designation of the 
Yucca Mountain site. 
9.6. Assertion 6: Transportation of Wastes to the Site Will Have a Dramatically Negative 
Economic Impact on Las Vegas 
There have been repeated assertions that shipments of radioactive waste through the Las Vegas 
valley could have effects on the local, entertainment-based, economy. Such effects could 
include, for example, discouraging tourism and lowering property values. These assertions are 
6 3 ~ b o ~ t  the Transportrrtion Scfi~lturds System. Office of Transportation Safeguards Facr Sheet. 
C 64 Presentation by Ronald Popc. Head of Transport Safety Unit for the Internal Atomic Energy Agency, at 131h International Synipos~um for Packing of Radioactive Materla14 2001. Chicago. IL. September 2001. 
largely unsupportable by any evidence and are addressed in the Final Environmental Impact 
a Statement. 
Much of what has been said in the preceding section applies here as well. The record speaks for 
itself. In addition to the history of safe shipment on interstate highways through relatively open 
spaces, five metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from 27 countries have, over the last 16 years, been 
transported without incident through Concord, California, and Charleston, South Carolina (the 
latter, like Las Vegas, a tourist destination). There is no reason to believe that a similar safe 
record will not be achieved in Nevada. 
The truth of it is that many tourists coming to Las Vegas will be farther from nuclear sites when 
they get there than when they left home. All major nuclear power generation facilities in the 
United States are located near large metropolitan centers in order to minimize the amount of 
power lost during transmission. It is thus not surprising that more than 161 million Americans 
are closer to a commercial nuclear facility than anyone in Las Vegas is to Yucca Mountain, as 
shown in Table 4. Indeed there are few large metropolitan centers that do not have a major 
nuclear facility located within 75 miles.65 
Table 4. U.S. Population in Contiguous United States Living Within Various Distances of 
Commercial Nuclear Facilities 
65 It is noteworthy that Atlantic City has three reactor sites closer than 75 miles at the same time its tourism-based 
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Table 4. U.S. Population in Contiguous United States Living Within Various Distances of 
Commercial Nuclear Facilities, continued 
Proposed Repository at Yucca Mountain 
Population around I 1.6781 13.0841 19.0691 14,7621 33.83 1 
WY 
Grand Total 
l ~ ~ c c a  Mounruin I I I I I I 
*State w~th  no cornmerc~al faci l~t~es  but w~th  orher nuclear I'ac~l~t~ea dcprrndtng on a repository for waste disposition. 
As shown in Table 5. 22 of the 30 most populous metropolitan areas in the United States have 36 
operating nuclear reactors closer to them than a waste repository at Yucca Mountain would be to 
Las Vegas, some 90 miles distant. 
24.126.975 80.733. I 8 I 56.752.239 104,859,156 
- 
161,651.160 
Table 5. Top 30 Metropolitan Areas in Contiguous U.S. by Population - Distance to Nearest 
Commercial Power Reactor (does not include other nuclear facilities that are 
dependent on a high-level repository for waste disposition) 
Table 5. Top 30 Metropolitan Areas in Contiguous U.S. by Population - Distance to Nearest 
Commercial Power Reactor, continued 
Notes 
1 Populations from 2000 Census data for Continental USA 
2 CMSA means 'Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area' 
3 MSA means 'Metropolitan Statistical Area' 
4 Distances shown are relatlve to a central feature such as a city hall, county seat, or capitol building. 
Many cities with strong tourism industries are located closer to existing storage facilities than 
Las Vegas would be to a repository at Yucca Mountain. Therefore, those who assert that a 
repository 90 miles from Las Vegas would have dramatically negative effects on local tourism 
have the burden of producing strong evidence to back up their claims. They have not done so. 
Thus, I know of no reason to believe that there is any compelling argument that the Las Vegas 
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The GAO did make this statement in its draft report, Tecllnic~11, Schedule, and Cost 
Uncertuirlties cftlle Y1rc.c~~ Moitntcrin Repositor?. Project. which was prematurely released.66 
After receiving the Department's response, however, in the final version of this report, released 
in December 200 1. GAO expressly acknowledged that "the Secretary has the discretion to make 
such a recommendation at this time." 67 
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9.7.2. DOE is rzor ready m make a site recommendcttion now because DOE and NRC have 
agreed on 293 technical items that need to be co~npleted before DOEfiles a license 
applicatiolz 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission provided a sufficiency letter to DOE on November 13, 
2001, that concluded that existing and planned work. upon completion, would be sufficient to 
apply for a construction authorization. The agreed upon course of action by DOE and the NRC 
is intended to assist in the license application phase of the project, not site recommendation. In 
consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff concerning licensing, DOE agreed it 
would obtain certain additional information relating to nine "key technical issues" to support 
license application. The DOE agreed to undertake 293 activities that would assist in resolution 
of these issues. 
The NRC has never stated that this was work that DOE needed to complete before site 
recommendation. In fact, it went out of its way not to do so. The Commission is well aware that 
section 114(a)(l)(E) of the NWPA requires a Secretarial recommendation of Yucca Mountain to 
be accompanied by a letter from the Commission providing its preliminary comments on the 
sufficiency of the information the Department has assembled for a construction license 
application. Had it been of the view that site recommendation should not proceed, its 
preliminary views would have stated that this information is not sufficient and that the 
Commission has no confidence that it ever will be. 
Instead, in its section 1 14(a)( 1 )(E) letter, the Commission said the opposite: "[Tlhe NRC 
believes that sufficient at-depth characterization analysis and waste form proposal information, 
although not available now, will be available at the rirne of (1 potential license application such 
that development of an acceptable license application is clchievable" (emphasis added). It also 
listed the outstanding issues as "closed pending." meaning that the NRC staff has confidence that 
DOE'S proposed approach, together with the agreement to provide additional information, 
acceptably addresses the issue so that no information beyond that provided or agreed to would 
likely be required for a license application. 
The DOE has completed over one-third of the actions necessary to fulfill the 293 agreements and 
has submitted the results to the NRC for review. The NRC has documented 23 of these as 
"complete." The remaining work consists largely of documentation (improve technical positions 
and provide additional plans and procedures) and confirmation (enhance understanding with 
additional testing or analysis or additional corroboration of data or models). 
As I explained earlier, the NWPA makes clear that site recommendation is an intermediate step. 
The filing of a construction license application is the step that comes after site recommendation 
is complete. It is entirely unsurprising that the Department would have to do additional work 
before taking that, next step. But the fact that the next step will require additional work is no 
reason not to take this one. 
9.7.3. Ir is premarure.for DOE ro make a reconzrnendarion now because DOE cannot 
complete this udditionul work until 2006. The NWPA reqliires DOE tofile a license 
upplicurion within 90 days of the approval ($site desigrzcrtion 
When Congress enacted the NWPA in !982, it included in the Act a series of deadlines that 
represented its best judgment regarding how iong various steps should take. These deadlines 
included the 90-day provision referenced above. They also included a requirement that DOE 
begin disposing of waste in 1998, in the expectation that a repository would by then have been 
built and licensed. 
Obviously, the timeframes set in the Act have proven to be optimistic. That is no reason, 
however, for the Department not to honor what was plainly their central function: to move along 
as promptly and as responsibly as possible in the development of a repository. Accordingly, to 
read the 90-day provision at issue as a basis for proceeding more slowly stands the provision on 
its head. 
Our current plans call for filing a license application at the end of 2004, not 2006. Assuming 
Congressional action on this question this year. that would mean that DOE could be two years 
late in filing the application. But any delay in site recommendation will only result in further 
delay in the filing of this application. For the reasons explained in section 7 , I  believe I have the 
information necessary to allow me to determine that the site is scientifically and technically 
suitable, and I have so determined. That being so. I am confident that I best honor the various 
deadlines set out in the Act, including the central 1998 deadline (already passed) specifying 
when the Department was to begin waste disposal, by proceeding with site recommendation as 
promptly as I can after reaching this conclusion. 
10. Conclusion 
As I explained at the outset of this document, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act vests 
responsibilities for deciding how this country will proceed with regard to nuclear waste in a 
number of different Federal and state actors. As Secretary of Energy, I am charged with making 
a specific determination: whether to recommend to the President that Yucca Mountain be 
developed as the site for a repository for spent fuel and high-level radioactive wastes. I have 
endeavored to discharge that responsibility conscientiously and to the best of my ability. ' 
The first question I believe the law asks me to answer is whether the Yucca Mountain site is 
scientifically and technically suitable for development as a repository. The amount and quality 
of research the Department of Energy has invested into answering this question - done by top- 
flight people, much of i t  on the watch of my predecessors from both parties - is nothing short of 
staggering. After careful evaluation, I am convinced that the product of over 20 years, millions 
of hours, and four billion dollars of this research provides a sound scientific basis for concluding 
that the site can perform safely during both the pre- and post-closure periods, and that it is indeed 
scientifically and technically suitable for development as a repository. 
Having resolved this fundamental question, I then turned to a second set of considerations: are 
there compel ling national interests that warrant proceeding with this project? I am convinced 
that there are, and that a repository for nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain will advance, in 
important ways, our energy security, our national security, our environmental goals, and our 
security against terroris? attacks. 
Finally, I examined the arguments that opponents of the project have advanced for why we 
should not proceed. I do not believe any of them is of sufficient weight to warrant following a 
different course. 
Accordingly, I have determined to recommend ro the President that he find Yucca Mountain 
qualified for application for a construction authorization before the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, and that he recommend it for development of a repository. 
